Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. The commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this verse. His commentary begins at 2.11.

There, in the midst of the armies, seeing Arjuna overwhelmed by the snares of attachment and bewilderment, the Blessed Lord spoke these words to rouse his discriminating wisdom: “Why do you grieve for those who are not to be grieved for?”

What is meant by 'not'? It does not mean 'I am not'—for God’s eternal nature is undeniable; rather it is stated illustratively: just as I am eternal, as declared in all the Vedanta texts, so too are you and the other rulers of men essentially eternal.

If one argues that the embodied self’s change of states (childhood, youth, old age) shows the self is not present in the body, that is not so—for the soul is recognized despite bodily differences, as when one persists through the changes from childhood to later bodies. Nor can the absence of sensory experience in a dead body imply the soul is absent—because perception ceases when the life-principal departs. Likewise, the fact that one says 'I am a man' rests on experiential knowledge and is not mere mental fabrication; scriptural testimony too has authority like perception and is not akin to a mere doctrine of the intellect, because it is apauruṣeya (not of human authorship). One cannot attribute apauruṣeya status to scripture from mere human assertion; without the accepted authority of a statement its apauruṣeya character cannot be posited. If someone refuses to accept scripture, that alone does not make scripture inapplicable; one cannot reject a universally held, authoritative teaching without grounds. Nor can I claim 'I did not hear it'—for that would invite reply, error, or charge of being the cause of all suffering, and would raise doubts about the author of scriptural authority. Nor can the scripture’s freedom from defect be proved by its own words alone; nor can statements that claim apauruṣeya status be shown to be eternal by citing similar sayings, since eternal acceptance requires continuous transmission. Therefore the authority of the sruti is established; hence the wise are not overcome by sophistries. Alternatively, if one grieves expecting the loss of life or the body, neither is lost—life is not lost because the self is eternal, so 'you are not' is spoken of non-acceptance of such loss. Nor is it said that the embodied self is the body: just as grief arises at the loss of childhood because of change of bodily state, similarly grief occurs on losing an old body when another body is obtained.

Even so, if one were to say that because the vision of that (true nature) is absent one grieves, the text replies: No. “Only contact of the senses” — these are the objects; their touches and their connections are what are cold and hot, pleasant and painful. In the body, through connection with cold and heat and so on, the Atman experiences cold and heat; from that arise pleasure and pain. For the Atman there is no suffering of itself. How could there be? Because it is not subject to birth and decay. Even if the Atman itself were asleep or unconscious, it would still be the Atman. Therefore those sense-contacts exist only when the senses are awake; they are not something else — this is the distinction of concomitance and nonconcomitance, not arising from the self. Nor is there any other relation of the self to objects merely because of those contacts. Nor, even when one speaks of the nonperishing due to non-arrival of the scriptures, is there permanence in the flow-like sense — since there is no sleep-like dissolution and so on, the text says: impermanent. Thus it is the body and its changing (modes) that are the cause of sorrow. Therefore for the one freed from that (i.e., liberated), kinship, death etc. no longer bring sorrow. Hence abandon pride and patiently endure those cold and heat and the like.

Therefore the purpose is declared: ‘He who ...’ — namely one whom these mere sense-contacts do not disturb. The qualifier ‘puruṣa’ indicates one free from attachment to the body; since all distress arises from bodily connection, he alone is the person (puruṣa). How do they not disturb him? Because he is equal-minded toward pain and pleasure — that is how, by steadiness (dhairya).

‘The self is eternal’ — why say the self is eternal if the self itself is not eternal? The answer: the Purāṇic and śruti authorities assert the being of Brahman, the cause, as existent; not so for an asat (nonbeing). Nature and the embodied being and time are all declared respectively as they are in Śiva-Vishnu Purāṇa: that which is different is said to exist separately. The existence of cause in the form of nonbeing is taught: the Lord is the sovereign of both the existent and non‑existent, the unmanifest and the manifest; from the non‑existent arises the existent — thus say the scriptures. The tradition accepts both statements; this is the final determination.

(No commentary provided.)

‘Let the body be destroyed, be it so’ — he does not say that the body is eternal. Rather: since the mirror’s destruction would mean the destruction of its reflection, he says that the self is the indweller of the body, for the sake of the Lord’s activity. He does not say the self is perishless as merely incidental; for the Lord, being beyond measurement, is not of the nature of an object. When the substratum (upādhi) for the reflection is absent, the reflection disappears notwithstanding the presence of the revealer. Here the revealer is self‑evident and constant; but there is indeed an upādhi for the attainment of liberation. The living being, endowed with consciousness, is like Kesava’s reflection — thus says Bhagavān.

‘But action is delusive’ — he says: in transactional (vyavahāra) terms it is delusion. Why? Because by the above reasons this (self) neither kills nor is killed. The reflection has no causal action of its own; it is the reflected image that acts in the appearance. As the śruti says, ‘[He who] meditates ...’ (Br.Up.).

Here the word ‘mantra‑letter’ is also present: ‘He does not take birth.’ Nor does the Lord, like one who merely attains knowledge, become born. This is corroborated by scriptural statements about time and circumstance: from place and time and condition this state arises; the undiminished one is the conscious self, etc., established by śruti and smṛti. Why? Because the Lord is characteristically unbegun and sovereign. He is eternally of one form. The Purāṇa says formerly He wore a body. Even so, he is not destroyed when the body is destroyed.

Therefore if one says that ‘thus he knows’ — how could that kill or strike the imperishable, the unborn, the one free from incidental destruction? The discrimination everywhere is: the eternal one is not subject to natural destruction. Where blemish‑filled persons are said to be destroyed, the term ‘destroyed’ is used for loss of qualities.

The illustration ‘skins’ is given for the purpose of discriminating body and self (deha‑ātma vivēka) — as in the example of garments.

That the imperishable is not characterized by particular incidental causes is denied — e.g., by saying ‘not like cutting off’ — therefore particular causal supports are negated. The present (sense) prohibition is against current perception; hence later it says: ‘not to be cut off.’ This indicates fitness to be spoken of from present perception. Why would it be unfit? Because the Lord is of special character as omnipresent etc.; ‘everlasting’ was spoken only of unity of form. The word ‘sthaṇu’ serves to exclude the opposite claim that ‘permanent’ means merely incidental; permanence is a particular qualification of omnipresence, not otherwise. Where unity is asserted, repeated statements and denominators are explained by scriptural reasons. The nature of mirror‑like relations and image–reflected properties are not contrary. Forms arise as forms and counter‑forms; they are mere semblances — established by śruti and smṛti. No contradiction arises from parts because the part follows from the whole. Neither is sameness of form opposed to parthood. The proof in both cases rests on scriptural passages. Nor is the reflection‑status of a part to be invented where the view of parts and bodies in other passages differs. Even for permanence the scripture says ‘so.’ The Lord is declared by both ways to be of both kinds of statements, owing to His inconceivable power. Nor does māyā alone in the Lord contradict Brahman, for the Lord’s sovereignty is different; the relation of cause and effect in Him is manifold. The great purport is that liberation (moksha) is the supreme human goal; that is the one end. ‘At the end they rejoice, not in the middle’ — scriptures testify that final attainment brings bliss and that liberation comes by Vishnu’s grace. Who, without worshiping Vasudeva, can attain liberation? By His grace ultimate perfection is had, no doubt. Those who are established in Him, taking refuge in the all‑pervading Self, surpass others; such are known to cross the worldly ocean. Thus by His grace one attains the supreme state — this is affirmed in many passages. That preeminence arises only by supreme knowledge and is world‑famous.

That which is attestable and unobjectionable by the world must be accepted here. Even Ahalyā’s affliction was due to a fault, yet she was not of many stains — this indicates elevation. He who knows Me thus, undeluded, knows the Supreme (Bhagavān) — so declares the scripture. ‘Truth, truth again truth’ — oaths and innumerable praises are used for Vishnu’s greatness. Scriptures in many ways extol His supremacy. Against those who deny that the Mahābhārata or other texts teach this unilateral supremacy, the counter‑argument is that numerous scriptures and Purāṇic narratives show Vishnu’s preeminence — examples: Markandeya, Puranic stories, and so on — establishing that entry into Him is what the scriptures teach. Thus the Lord’s supremacy is the great purport of all authoritative texts, though each text retains its own direct validity. Differences in genre (Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Veda) and apparent contradictions are adjudicated in tradition; the Lord’s supremacy is the overarching meaning. The Vedas are said to be devoted to Narayana; all Vedas that declare Vasudeva are thus Vasudeva‑parā. The customs and the triads of thing, substance, action and time are established earlier; hence this is proved. Because of the Lord’s inconceivable power, māyā is not one single thing. The Lord’s powers are manifold and described in many places; He is not merely māyā in nature. Therefore He is not only composed of maya. His unshakable bliss and knowledge and other attributes are declared in scriptural passages cited.

Therefore He is declared to be of the nature of the unmanifest (avyakta) and so forth.

Thus the Self is everlasting; yet because birth and death arise from the union and separation of body, one speaks of it as the same. Or: ‘ataḥ chety’—thus he says.

Whence then sorrow?—He says: because of the settled association (of body) one is born.

That very statement clarifies: the unmanifest and so on.

Because the association and dissociation of the body are fixed, and because the Self is of the nature of God (Ishvara)—always free from decay—there is no need for sorrow; to summarize: God’s power again shows that one should not grieve, as if wondrous. ‘Wondrous’ here means rare. In the world that rarity is wonder; though rare, because of the finer apprehension of the Self and the fact that one possesses divine nature, the Self is subtle and the seer thereof is rare.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this sloka.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this śloka.

'Sāṅkhya' denotes jñāna — the pure knowledge of the nature of the self (ātmatattva-vijñāna), as declared by the Lord and in the Smṛtis of Vyāsa. 'Yoga' is the means; 'yogāḥ' are the practices resorted to by people for liberation and welfare. Because the passage uses these terms in opposition, both sāṅkhya and yoga are here treated as applicable methods. Where both terms occur together elsewhere, they indicate method (upādēya) — for example in the Pañcarātra and Citraśikhāṇḍa schools which derive from Vedic roots and sometimes use 'sāṅkhya-yoga' collectively. 'Yuktēś ca jñānam' — 'jñāna' preceded by 'yukta' means knowledge joined with means. 'Upāyaś ca vakṣyate' — the means will be spoken of. 'Buddhyatē anayetīti buddhiḥ' — buddhi here is that by which one is discriminatively known; 'sāṅkhya-viṣayo yāyā vācā budhyatē' — that is the meaning of the wording.

Sri Madhvacharya did not comment on this śloka.

'Yoga imāṁ buddhiṁ śṛṇvīti' — 'many opinions of the wise differing among themselves, how shall I fix on one?' — this is the sense: the word 'vyavasāya-ātmike' indicates that he pleads for a settled, decisive conviction. It means that among rightly determined judgments one unified view is to be taken.

'Syuravaidikāni matāni' — these may be Vedic opinions, but indeterminate (avyavasāya-ātmaka), not the definitive Vedic doctrine. Some of them prescribe actions promising heavenly rewards only; hence 'yāṁ i mām iti' (they say, "this is the goal"). 'Yā'm āhuḥ tayer iti' — they speak in the sense of 'those two' (the two paths). Seeking liberation, they speak alluringly of heaven and such; those devoted to Vedic utterance often expound rites and the like. The Vedas speak in an indirect, suggestive way; the gods too prefer the indirect (paroṣkya). Therefore they commonly speak of the Lord by way of implication.

'Bhogaiśvarya-matiṁ tat-prāptiṁ prati' — referring to the enjoyment, lordship, and attainment — that attainment is the fruit which the Vedas describe.

The properly determined, discriminative intellect of those persons is not prescribed for samādhi (in the sense of meditative absorption) as an object distinct from samādhi. When the mind, intent on the Lord, is rightly settled on the Lord's determinate purport, that is samādhi — and that is the means to moksha. This statement is not elsewhere given as a direct verbal admission for apprehending that reality; even an instance used in a dream-interpretation (nirukta) shows that household enjoyments should not be taken as authoritative for the essential truth.

'Tām yogabuddhim āha — triguṇya-viṣayā' — he explains the yoga-mind as being occupied with objects of the three guṇas. Because other passages of the Vedas are indirect, and the three guṇas are connected with heaven and such, the meaning appears to be concerned with those effects. The Veda is said to speak indirectly; therefore do not be misled about the immediate purport. The Vedas, Rāmāyaṇa and Purāṇas sing of Viṣṇu from beginning to middle to end; all the Vedas contain that word. The Vedas are indeed the root of dharma, and recollection and conduct of those who know them — as quoted in Smṛti and other sources — assert Viṣṇu-pervasiveness and thus prescribe what is appropriate and what is contrary.

Yet he says 'equal are the fruit of the desirous and the fruit of the wise' — meaning: as when a well fills with water up to as high as the outlet, so the fruits present everywhere even for the knower in the Vedas. The Brahmin is the direct knower of Brahman; "vijānataḥ" indicates that the knower attains the fruit of knowledge — that he goes to Brahman.

He censures the desirous (kāma-ātmanāḥ). How then can one who seeks heaven perform sacrifices? The scriptures do ordain even for desire-driven people, hence 'karmaṇy ēva' — to mark that point. Are the wise then bound to act for fruit like others? No — some are not so. A wise person may be led astray by passion similarly to kings, and if their sattva were pure they would have knowledge; instruction establishes knowledge for them. The mention of 'ārṣṭi' and other terms counts the wise and shows prohibition of desire. Fruits arise from freedom of will; they do not arise without action. Even the desirous, by wrongful effort, sometimes obtain results by resistance. Therefore abstention from action (karmākaraṇa) is no guarantee of fruitless result; nor does knowledge or desireless conduct by itself ensure fruit. Hence 'karmaṇy eva adhikāras' — one has a right to action; therefore action is to be performed. Not that desire will make one attain the fruit, but likewise not by mere prohibition of action, knowledge, or desirelessness will fruit be secured. The exhortation against desire indicates the Lord's intent to stimulate zeal by the promise of fruit — as one praises medicine by its taste. Thus 'kāmī yajet' means 'let the desirous perform the act', not 'become desirous'. 'Mā tat' — "do not be attached to the fruit" — warns against affection for inaction; otherwise even in absence of fruit one might presume divine favor. From great practice and kindness people come to seek devotion. One does not feel such affection toward a self-seeker. When one says 'what shall I give?' a petitioner receives affection; so the longing for bhakti and jñāna is established.

This explains the previous verse: 'yogastha' means established in means. 'Yogastha' is one who, renouncing attachment (saṅga) and love of fruit, is equal in pleasure and pain, success and failure. That state is the yoga spoken of by Me.

'Therefore take refuge in yoga' — he says 'dūreṇa' to indicate withdrawal: buddhi-yoga is the characteristic of jñāna and the means to attain it. 'Dūreṇa' means entirely apart. Hence one should take refuge in the steadiness of knowledge. The fruits of action are the cause of action; those who are attached to results are fruit-motivated.

The fruit of knowledge is declared: “One established in buddhi” (2.50). Even meritorious actions can yield results displeasing to some—human pleasures and the like—and inferior fruits are given by ritual observances; action is not thereby destroyed. Scriptural passages (e.g. Brāhmaṇa statements) show that through ignorance one performs sacrifices and austerities for many thousands of years and obtains results accordingly. Hence the texts about the exhaustion of action apply everywhere to ignorance; even the passages about both exhaustions refer to undesirable objects; the exhaustion of meritorious action has no useful purpose. A knower’s activity is not annihilated. Some objects are indeed desired: if one wishes for the world of the fathers, the fathers arise at his resolve; if one longs for the assembly of Prajāpati, fame among Brahmins, companionship of women, or vehicles, those are produced by one’s wish—scriptural statements testify to this. Desire creates those very things in the soul; desire-wishes move along in the form of desires. Though numerous, because the self’s blissful nature is repeated, the pleasure from action conflicts with the self’s bliss and with power of experience and with God’s grace and with scriptural testimony. The body’s destruction does not precede that [liberation]. He goes there [to the happy realm]; that blissful self enters it—scripture and reply-state this. He is not absorbed completely by Brahman. Criticisms that in supreme knowledge the immersed one would be afflicted are answered: the removal of names and distinctions prevents those objections. The world-penetration and renunciation of worldly affairs, taught for men like Śuka, show that by relying on this knowledge one attains the sameness with me (Vishnu). On the removal of adjuncts, the reflected form is also removed. We do not find the distinct honor of the wholly absorbed in separate knowledge; the objection that the absorbed one would be miserable in supreme knowledge is answered by the absence of distinction. Nor do we see in the world the identity of reflection and reflected: upon removal of the adjunct there is an honor or estimation. The statement “in supreme knowledge what greater misery could there be?” is answered by noting that as long as the sense of self remains, suffering may be spoken of; the texts treat the adjuncts as impermanent. Therefore even a single-statement presentation, though stylistic, is acceptable. Your visions of the Lord and the differences reported by Nārada are described: branches and singlefoldness are asserted in various passages. In disputes force belongs to reasoned argument; the texts such as “the immersed one” are cited. Thus water is said to be one with water; purity remains pure—rivers meet the sea, and mutual selfhood still coexists; distinctions among great ones can arise. The sea has mouths though it is one; greatness causes difference. The poet praised the waters and their giver. The gods like Brahmā and others may not attain what the capable ones obtain; Nārada’s prohibition and the scriptural deliberation establish the decision about liberation. Where one sees nothing else, the statements such as “he is one” are to be understood as referring to the subordinate entity. Otherwise how would sovereignty and so on arise? It is not said that that place is composed of māyā; otherwise why would textually it be called “one” there? Nor is it opposed that the self has a body. The distinction and special nature of bodies are non-physical and produced by Lordly power; in the narrative of Narāyaṇa the body is born by the sixteen impulses called kalā. Scripts treat worldly signs—lack of unusual features, lack of rejoicing, un-rapture, happiness and sorrow—as applying to those bodies; they do not perish in creation nor arise in dissolution, etc. Ordinary practice refers to that. The bodies of Vaikuṇṭha-dwellers lack sense-organs; liberation is not some minor, secondary thing: one does not attain a partial absence of bondage; the scripture’s decision is that the yogi attains full release in due measure. Those who enter the Lord right here, they afterward go there; fitness is here determined. Other criticisms by Yudhiṣṭhira are also answered. Union (sāyujya) is likened to acquiring a deity-spot. Freed ones in the excellent world enjoy external enjoyments; hence separation from the undesirable is appropriate. They are free from sorrow and all sorrow — the great bliss where one does not grieve is specially mentioned. Those whose hunger is acute do not attain sāyujya; they have only proximity, etc. Because remnants of past actions remain, after enjoying those they attain union. All such scriptural statements about contraction follow from the respective authority. Entry into the supreme Lord Viṣṇu is certain. Therefore complete separation from the undesirable is affirmed. One prays even to Brahmā and others asking “I desire supreme-Brahmanhood,” proving that liberation is sought from Them too. Liberation surpasses any other happiness; Vaishṇava bliss is large and perceivable by word and mind. Thus one should strive for yoga and knowledge as means; action is the skill in means. (End of commentary excerpt.)

He says the means is “born of action”: actions that are born of works — abandoning attachment to the fruit, offering it to God, and being endowed with right discrimination — the wise attain the supreme station. That yoga (action) is an aid for knowledge; its purport is that it is a means to liberation.

“How long must actions be performed by the seeker?” — thus he asks, and the reply is: the decisive gain is dispassion. From practice comes it; hence the Brāhmaṇa says that Brahminship is learnt by practice. Dispassion is not acquired otherwise; when present, one is deemed learned. Hearing of the greatness of the Lord does not produce aversion in the knowers. Sages delight in the Self though they are free from clinging; they perform devotion and rites. The fruits of their practice are not mere enjoyments because their bliss is great. Their detachment may arise from meditating upon the Lord’s lotus-feet or hearing the story of the birth of the world; even worship yields results for them by degrees. If hierarchy (tāratamya) were absent, even the unwilling would not be reckoned absolutely deprived of liberation — some attain release even without desiring it, as examples like Supratīkādī show. Distinctions of devotees and of liberated ones are manifest; the supreme bliss of the attained differs by degree; freed ones will not surpass My devotees, nor will My devotees surpass the knowers in certain respects. Thus dispassion is not solely determined by scripture here; one attains fruits of Veda by proper practice and hearing.

“That very thing the scriptures make clear to one who opposes them.” Earlier the scriptures were opposed by the Vedas, but when the opposers become steady in the meaning of the Vedas and in firm conviction, even contrary words do not move them; then they are established in samādhi. By direct vision of Brahman, even blows of a drum or the like do not disturb one who is absorbed in supreme bliss. Thus: having attained the means, you will attain yoga.

“He whose knowledge is steady is said to be of steady wisdom.” The commentator (Bhāṣya) indicates the characteristic and then asks further: who is the Brahman, the Lord, Rudra in whom the samādhi one dwells? Keshava answers. Etymologies in the Harivaṃśa name Rudra as Śaṅkara in the journey to Kailāsa; earlier kings and seer-sages knew these features. The Puranic narratives are not secret to the simple-minded; they ask about duties and public matters.

“Activity such as going on is not preceded by new intention,” etc.—the mark is shown by analogy with regular activity, and the question arises why one who is satisfied in supreme bliss still acts. The answer: latent impressions and past merits incline one to some limited action even in the perfected. Usually they abandon all desires, as seen in Śuka and others who perceive God and desire devotion to His feet. When desire for sense-objects arises (e.g. for Indra and such), one is seized; this occurs since great men have stronger causes for action. Hence if peculiar urges arise in those of lesser qualification, they are not to be treated as the knower’s behaviour. The mark of non-attachment is not “does not practice samādhi” — non-attachment is the absence of clinging everywhere. One who is absorbed has no obtaining of auspicious or inauspicious results in the impersonal samādhi, though even in the cognitive samādhi there is not rule to the contrary. Desires can yet arise in distracted minds. The scriptural statements show that desires in knowers are destroyed by knowledge and reliance on God. The mind-formed desires are therefore said to be overcome; taste (rasa) too, when seen as superior, turns away. Therefore the self is not the individual jīva.

This is clarified by the three following verses: these alone are the means of knowledge. ‘Attraction to fair meditation’ is raga; rasa is raga too and attachment is called fair meditation; these are the terms used.

Because of absence of attachment everywhere, one rejoices not and hates not on receiving auspicious or inauspicious things.

Because of absence of attachment everywhere, one rejoices not and hates not on receiving auspicious or inauspicious things.

The verse that follows does not portray that mark as arising merely from effort. Fasting alone removes the capacity for sense-object enjoyment; absence of desire for other objects or for taste does not turn one away — he is turned away only by direct knowledge. The Mahābhāgavata passage says the senses are conquered quickly by fasting; the word ‘rasa’ (taste) indicates longing or attachment.

Even those knowers lacking direct knowledge but exerting ordinary effort have their mind seize the senses. The fault lies with the man who identifies with the body: such persons are rash and prone to indulge in strife.

He says: they are indeed attainable by much effort. Therefore one should make effort. ‘Mind engaged in Me’ — the soul devoted to Me; ‘I am supreme above all, he who is my devotee is my foremost’ — the sense is that the fruit is under My control.

He mentions, by a pair of verses, the causes of attachment and other faults in order that they may be avoided. ‘Sammohah’ means unlawful desire. The word moha is here explained as upagīta-sumohā—an intense delusion. The mark of adharmā (unrighteousness) is established in sinful acts. Elsewhere sammohah is explained as adharmakāmitā—desire for unrighteousness. Distortion of memory (smṛti-vibhrama) is the destruction of memory by opposing factors; destruction of intelligence (buddhi-nāśa) is the intellect’s ruin; destruction of the self’s discriminative faculty (sarvātmanā doṣa-buddhi-nāśa) is the loss of right judgment; one perishes and attains hellish miseries. It is likewise said: when forgetfulness arises in those who are inclined to unrighteousness, and when faults and their results are unseen, they fall into hell.

(Same as 2.62) He states, by the twin verses, the causes of attachment and similar faults so they may be removed. ‘Sammohah’ means unrighteous desire; moha denotes intense delusion. The characteristic of adharmā is settled in sinful deeds. Elsewhere sammohah is defined as adharmakāmitā. Distortion of memory (smṛti-vibhrama) is the annihilation of memory by opposing causes; destruction of intellect (buddhi-nāśa) is the ruin of right thought; the complete ruin of discriminative intellect brings suffering and hell. Thus when forgetfulness arises in those prone to unrighteousness, and faults and their fruits are unseen, they go to hell.

He next, in the two following verses, declares the fruit of sense-control: even though the self (Atman) does not enjoy objects, if the mind is established in submission (prasad—mental tranquillity), that one is a jīta-ātmā—a self-conqueror.

How? By mere tranquillity (prasāda) all sorrow is removed. A mind serene (prasanna-cetas) abides firmly in direct knowledge of Brahman (brahma-aparokṣa), attaining steady realization. ‘Prasāda’ commonly means the mind’s repose, usually produced by withdrawal from sense‑objects.

In the absence of tranquillity he speaks of fault in the next two verses. Without mental calm there is no suppression of desire even for one composed of disciplined thought. An undisciplined mind lacks right knowledge; that alone leads to its birth (of faults), and not to non‑existence. From the terms śānti, mokṣa, śāntiḥ, mokṣaḥ, nirvāṇa are signified.

How does a person without self‑discipline cease to have right feeling? He says: ‘indriyāṇām’—through the senses. The mind—when directed by the Lord—is engaged by the senses; accordingly the intellect (buddhi) follows and knowledge arises. Though discriminative悟 (prajñā) may spring up, it does not prevent the recurrence of passion; even when generated, it may be overborne.

Therefore he counsels restraining the senses with whole-hearted effort—tasmat sarvātmanā nigṛhīte indriya eva jñānī iti—hence the injunction ‘tasmād’.

The described characteristic is gathered and then he says: ‘yā niśa’—that night. That night is the distinguishing mark of the Supreme Lord’s form: in that night all beings, as if asleep, know nothing; in that night the embodied knower, attached to the senses, wakes and, by direct perception of the Supreme, sees the Lord. Where the characteristic is of objects, beings are awake; where it is the night‑characteristic, beings are, as it were, asleep and generally ignorant. From Me and others there is movement arising; thus the body is said to be subject to fate; and though it is mortal, yet a part is a mover. Manas with reflective practice the sage: ‘He sees’—this is the means.

By that he signifies the mode of experiencing objects: ‘apūryamāṇa’—though the senses be filled with objects, if one remains immovable and steadfast, he attains neither disturbance nor striving, nor does he dry up for want. Just as the ocean is not agitated by rivers entering it, he obtains liberation.

He means: renouncing the whole world of desires and objects, one who acts without attachment, neither desiring nor rejecting objects, and without egoistic ‘I eat’—i.e., devoid of aham-kāra and māmakāra—such a man is truly superior. He alone attains liberation.

‘Upasaṃharati’—he withdraws. The state of brāhmī is the state established in Brahman and His objects; its sign is: even at death one in that state attains Brahman, otherwise he receives another birth. Since whatever (one) attains—etc., is being explained: even for the wise there is, due to prārabdha karma, transfer of bodies. ‘Bhogena tvi tare’ is stated elsewhere: indeed the results of actions yield many body‑fruits; some attain many bodies. Thus even for the wise many‑bodied results occur. It is said that the stable‑wise one who has reached the supreme seat is taken up, then—by the grace of Vishnu—liberation follows. Narrations (Nāradīya, Garuḍa) then discuss the nature of liberation, the role of devotion, the efficacy of remembrance and such; but here the purport is: the knower gains liberation; for others immediate liberation may not occur because the present injunction—'renounce the body'—is given as timely counsel. For those whose time of death is ripe, Vishnu‑maya at that moment turns their minds outward; their memory then fails. By many lives’ fruit, those who worship Hari through devotion and knowledge—by remembrance the Lord reaches them; otherwise not. In scripture many statements on nirvāṇa, formlessness, and the Lord’s supreme nature occur; but these are narrative expositions of the Lord’s glory and play (līlā), not contradictions to the revealed means. Therefore the sufficient release of the wise is established; for others liberation at that instant may not obtain—scripture explains various positions and authorities; the essence is: for the knowers there is direct deliverance.