18.1 O mighty-armed Hrsikesa, kesi-nisudana, O slayer of (the demon) Kesi; icchami, I want; veditum, to know; prthak, severally, through their mutual distinctions; tattvam, the truth, the intrinsic nature, i.e. the real meaning; sannyasasya, of sannyasa, i.e. the meaning of the word sannyasa, ca, as also; tyagasya, of tyaga, i.e. the meaning of the word tyaga. Kesi was a demon who had assumed the form of a horse, and Lord Vasudeva had killed him. Hence He is addressed by that name (Kesi-nisudana) by Arjuna. The word sannyasa and tyaga, used in various places in the preceding chapters, are not explicit in their implications. Therefore, in order to determine them for Arjuna who had put the estion,-

18.2 Some kavayah, learned ones; viduh, know; sannyasam, sannyasa, the meaning of the word sannyasa, the non-performance of what comes as a duty; to be the nyasam, giving up; karmanam, of actions; kamyanam, done with a desire for reward, e.g. Horse-sacrifice etc. Sarva-karma-phala-tyagah, abandonment of the results of all actions, means the giving up of the results accruing to oneself from all actions- the daily obligatory and the occasional (nitya and naimittika) that are performed. Vicaksanah, the adepts, the learned ones; prahuh, call, speak of that; as tyagam, tyaga, as the meaning of the word tyaga. Even if 'the giving up of actions for desired results' or 'the abandonment of results' be the intended meaning, in either case the one meaning of the words sannyasa and tyaga amounts only to tyaga (giving up); they do not imply distinct categories as do the words 'pot' and 'cloth'. Objection: Well, is it not that they say the daily obligatory (nitya) and the occasional (naimittika) rites and duties have no results at all? How is the giving up of their results spoken of-like the abandoning of a son of a barren woman?! Reply: This defect does not desire. It is the intention of the Lord that the nitya-karmas (daily obligatory duties) also have results; for the Lord will say, 'The threefold results of actions-the undesirable, the desirable and the mixed-accrue after death to those who do not resort to tyaga', and also, 'but never to those who resort to sannyasa (monks)' (12). Indeed, by showing that, it is only in the case of sannyasins (monks) alone that there is no connection with the results of actions, the Lord asserts in, '৷৷.accrue after death to those who do not resort to tyaga (renunciation)' (abid.), that the result of daily obligatory (nitya) duties accrue to those who are not sannyasins (monks).

18.3 Eke, some; manisinah, learned ones, subscribing to the views of the Sankhyas and others; prahuh, say; that dosavat, beset with evil (as it is);-What is it?- karma, action, all actions, becuase they are the cause of bondage; tyajyam, should be given up even by those who are eligible for actions (rites and duties). Or, it (action) is to be given up dosavat, just as defects such as attachment etc. are renounced. Ca and, in that very context; apare, others; (say) that yajana-dana-tapah-karma, the practice of sacrifice, charity and auterity; na tyajyam, should not be given up. These alternatives are with regard to only those who are alified for action, but not with regard to the monks who are steadfast in Knowledge and have gone beyond the stages of life. This discussion is not concerned with those who are held to be outside the scope of eligibility for action in the assertion (by the Lord), 'The steadfastness in the Yoga of Knowledge by men of realization was spoken of by Me in the days of yore' (see 3.3). Objection: Well, just as those who are alified for rites and duties and who have their distinct steadfastness are being considered here in the chapter summarizing the entire scripture, though they have been dealt with earlier in '৷৷.through the Yoga of Action for the yogis' (3.3), similarly, let even the men of realization who are steadfast in Knowledge be considered here. Reply: No, because it is not logical that their renunciation should result from delusion and sorrow (cf. 7 and 8). The men of realization do not perceive in the Self the sorrows arising from physical torment; for it has been shown that desire etc. are attributes only of the field (body) (see 13.6). Therefore, they do not renounce action but of fear for physical trouble and pain. Nor do they perceive actions in the Self, on account of which they should give up obligatory duties out of delusion. In fact, they renounce with the conviction that 'action belongs to the organs' (see 3.28); 'I certainly do not do anything' (see 5.8); for, the mode of renunciation of an enlightened person was shown in, '৷৷.having given up all actions mentally' (5.13). Therefore, those others who are alified for rites and duties, who are unelightened about the Self, and for whom renunciation is possible out of delusion and from fear of physical trouble, are alone condemned as persons who, being possessed of tamas and rajas, resort to renunciation. And this is done with a veiw to eulogizing the renunciation of the results of rites and duties by the unenlightened men of action. Besides, the men of renunciation in the real sense have been particularly pointed out in, 'who has renounced ever undertaking,' 'who is silent, content with anything, homeless, steadyminded' (12.16, 19), and also (while determining) the characteristics of one who has transcended the gunas (Chapter 14). The Lord will further say, '৷৷.which is the supreme consummation of Knowledge' (50). Therefore the monks steadfast in Knowledge are not intended to be spoken of here. It is only the abandoning of the results of action which, by virtue of its being imbued with the ality of sattva, is spoken of as sannyasa in contrast to the renunciation of actions which is possessed of tamas etc.; it is not sannyasa in the primary-sense-the renunciation of all actions. Objection: According to the reason shown in the text, 'Since it is not possible for one who holds on to a body to give up actions entirely' (11), may it not be argued that the actions entirely' (11), may it not be argued that the word sannyasa is certainly used in the primary sense because it is impossible to abandon all works? Reply: No, for the next adducing the reason is meant for eulogy. Just as, 'From renunciation immediately (follows) Peace' (12.12), is a mere eulogy of renunciation of the fruits of action, it having been enjoined on Arjuna who was unenlightened and incapable of undertaking the various alternatives (paths) as stated earlier, so also is this sentence, 'Since it is not possible for one who holds on to a body to give up actions entirely' (11), meant for eulogizing the renunciation of the resorts of all actions. No one can point an exception to the proposition that 'having given up all actions mentally, (the embodied man of self-control) continues happily৷৷.without doing or causing (others) to do anything at all' (see 5.13). Therefore these alternative veiws regarding sannyasa and tyaga are concerned only with those who are alified for rites and duties. But the enlightened ones who have realized the supreme Truth are competent only for steadfastness in Knowledge, which is characterized by renunciation of all actions; not for anything else. Hence, they do not come within the purview of the alternative veiws. Thus has this been pointed out by us in connection with the text, '৷৷.he who knows this One as indestructible৷৷.' (2.21) as also in the beginning of the third chapter.

18.4 Bharata-sattama, O the most excellent among the descendants of Bharata; srnu, hear, understand; me, from Me, from My statement; niscayam, the firm conclusion; tatra tyage, regarding that tyaga, regarding these alternative veiws on tyaga and sannyasa as they have been shown. Hi, for; purusavyaghra, O greatest among men; tyagah, tyaga; samprakirtitah, has been clearly declared, has been distinctly spoken of in the scriptures; to be trividhah, of three kinds, threefold, under the classes of tamasa (those based on tamas [Tamas: darkness, mental darkness, ignorance; one of the three alities of everything in Nature. Also see 14.8, and note under 2.45.-Tr.], etc. The Lord has used the word tyaga with the idea that the (primary) meanings of tyaga and sannyasa are verily the same. Since it is difficult to comprehend this idea, that the primary meanings of the words tyaga and sannyasa can be threefold under the classification based on tamas etc. in the case of one who is unenlightened and who is alified for rites and duties-but not in the case of one who has realized the supreme Goal-,therefore no one else is capable of speaking the truth in this connection. Hence, listen to the firm conclusion of the Lord with regard to the supreme Truth as revealved by the scriptures. Which, again, is this firm conclusion? In reply the Lord says:

18.5 Yajna-dana-tapah-karma, the practice of sacrifice, charity and austerity-this threefold practice; na tyajyam, is not to be abandoned; tat, it; is eva, surely; karyam, to be undertaken. Why? Yajnah, sacrifice; danam, charity; and tapah, austerity; are eva, verily; pavanani, the purifiers, the causes of sanctification; manisinam, of the wise, i.e. of those who do not seek results for themselves.

18.6 Tu, but; api, even; etani, these; karmani, actions, viz sacrifice, charity and austerity, which have been spoken of as purifiers; kartavyani, have to be undertaken; tyaktva, by renouncing; sangam, attachment to them; and by giving up (hankering for) their phalani, results. Iti, this; is me, My; niscitam, firm; and uttamam, best; matam, conculsion. Having promised, 'hear from Me the firm conclusion regarding that (tyaga)' (4) and also adduced the reason that they are purifiers, the utterance, 'Even these actions have to be performed. This is the firm and best conclusion', is only by way of concluding the promised subject-matter; this sentence does not introduce a fresh topic. For it stands to reason that the phrase 'even these' refers to some immediate topic under discussion. The implication of the word api (even) is: 'Even these acts, which are causes of bondage to one who has attachment and who hankers after their results, have to be undertaken by a seeker of Liberation.' But the phrase 'even these' is not used in relation to other acts. Others explain (thus): Since the nityakarmas have no results, therefore (in their case) it is illogical to say, 'by giving up attachment and (hankering for their) results'. The meaning of the phrase etani api (even these) is that, 'even these rites and duties, which are undertaken for desired results and are different from the nityakarmas, have to be undertaken. What to speak of the nityakarmas like sacrifice, charity and austerity!' (Reply:) This is wrong since it has been established by the text, 'sacrifice, charity and austerity are verily the purifiers,' that even the nityakarmas have results. For a seeker of Liberation who wants to give up even the nityakarmas from fear of their being causes of bondage, how can there be any association with actions done for desired results? Moreover, the phrase etani api cannot apply to actions done for desired results (kamyakarmas), since they have been denigrated in, '৷৷.indeed, actions is ite inferior' (2.49), and in, '৷৷.by actions other than that action meant for God' (3.9), and since, on the strength of the texts [Which support the two earlier arguments.], 'the Vedas have the three alities as their object' (2.45), 'Those who are versed in the Vedas, who are drinkers of Soma,৷৷.(pray for the heavenly goal by worshipping) Me' (9.20), and 'they enter into the human world on the exhaustion of their merit' (9.21), it has been definitely stated that actions done for desired results are causes of bondage; and also because they are far removed from the context.

18.7 Therefore, sannyasah, the abandoning; niyatasya tu karmanah, of the daily obligatory acts, by the seeker of Liberation who is as yet unenlightened and is fit for rites and duites; na apapadyate, is not justifiable, because what is desired is the purification of unenlightened persons. Parityagah, giving up; tasya, of that, of the daily obligatory duty; mohat, through delusion, through ignorance; parikirtitah, is declared; to be tamasah, based on tamas. Niyata is that duty which must be performed. That an act is niyata (obligatory) and it is relinished is contradictory. Therefore the giving up of that through delusion is declared to be based on tamas, for delusion is tamas. Besides,

18.8 Yat, whatever; karma, action; tyajet, one may relinish, eva, merely; iti, as being; kuhkham, painful; [As being impossible to accomplish.] kaya-klesa-bhayat, from fear of physical suffering, out of fear of bodily pain; sah, he; krtva, having resorted; tyagam, to renunciation; rajasam, based on rajas, arising from rajas; will eva, surely; na labhet (shuld rather be labhate), not acire; tyaga-phalam, fruits of renunciation, the result called Liberation, which follows from renunciation of all actions as a conseence of Illumination. Which, again, is the renunciation based on sattva?

18.9 Yat, whatever; niyatam karma, daily obligatory duty; kriyate, is performed, accomplished; iti eva, just because; it is karyam, a bounden duty; O Arjuna, tyaktva, by giving up; sangam, attachment; and phalam, the result; ca eva, as well; sah, that; tyagah, renunciation, giving up of attachment and (hankering for) the resutls of daily obligatory duties; matah, is considered; to be sattvikah, based on sattva, arising from sattva. We said that the Lord's utterance is proof of the fruitfulness of daily obligatory duties. Or, even if the niyakarmas be understood (from the Lord's worlds) to be fruitless, still the ignorant man does certainly imagine that the nityakarmas (daily obligatory duites) when performed produce for oneself a result either in the form of purification of the mind or avoidance of evil. As to this, the Lord aborts even that imagination by saying, 'by giving up the result'. Hence it has been well said, 'by giving up attachment and the result'. Objection: Well, is not the threefold relinishment of actions, also called sannyasa, under discussion? As regards this, the renunciation based on tamas and rajas have been stated. Why is the relinishment of attachment and (desire for their) results spoken of here as the third? This is like somody saying, 'Three Brahmanas have come. Of them two are versed in the six auxiliaries [The six auxiliaries are: Siksa (Phonetics), Kalpa (Code of Rituals and Sacrifices), Vyakarana (Grammar), Nirukta (Etymology), Chandas (Meter, Prosody), and Jyotisa (Astronomy).-Tr.] of the Vedas; the third is a Ksatirya!' Reply: This is not wrong, for this is meant as a eulogy on the basis of the common factor of renunciation. Between renunciation of actions and renunciation. of hankering for results, there is, indeed, the similarity of the fact of renunciation. While on this subject, by condemning 'renunciation of actions' on account of its being based on rajas and tamas, the 'renunciation of desire for results of actions' is being praised on account of its being based on sattva, by saying, 'that renunciation is considered to be based on sattva.' The internal organ of a person who is alified for rites and duties, who performs the nityakarmas by giving up attachment and hankering for results, becomes pure on account of its being untainted by attachment to results etc. and refined by the nitya-karmas. When it is pure and tranil, it becomes capable of contemplating on the Self. Since, for that very person whose internal organ has become purified by performing the nityakarmas and who has become ready for the knowledge of the Self, the process by which he can become steadfast in it has to be stated, therefore the Lord says:

18.10 Na devesti, he does not hate; akusalam, unbefitting; karma, action, rites and duties meant for desired results-with the idea, 'What is the usefulness of this which is a cause of transmigration through fresh embodiment?' Na anusajjate, he does not become attached to; kusale, befitting activity, daily obligatory duties, by thinking that this is the cause of Liberation by virtue of its being the cause of purification of the mind, rise of Knowledge and steadfastness in it. That is to say, he does not entertain any liking even for it, because he finds no purpose in it. Who, again, is he? Tyagi, the man of renunciation, who has become so by having given up attachment and rewards of action in the manner stated above. He is a tyagi who performs nityakarmas by relinishing attachment to those acts and (their) results. Again, it is being stated as to when that person does not hate an unbefitting act and does not become attached to a befitting activity: When he has become sattva-samavistah, imbued with sattva, i.e., when he is filled with, possessed of, sattva, which is the means to the knowledge that discriminates between the Self and the not-Self; and hence medhavi, wise-endowed with intelligence (medha), intuitive experience, characterized as knowledge of the Self; one possessed of that is medhavai (wise)-; and owing to the very fact of being wise, chinnasamsayah, freed from doubts-one whose doubts created by ignorance have been sundered, one who is freed from doubts by his firm conviction that nothing but abiding in the ture nature of the Self is the supreme means to the highest Good. The person competent (for rites and duties) who, having gradually become purified in mind through the practice of Karma-yoga in the way described above, has realized as his own Self the actionless Self, which is devoid of modifications like birth etc., he, '৷৷.having given up all actions mentally, remaining at without doing or causing (others) to do anything at all' (cf. 5.13), attains steadfastness in Knowledge, which is characterized as 'actionless-ness'. In this way, the purpose of the aforesaid Karma-yoga has been stated through the present verse. On the other hand, since, for the unenlightened person-who, while being alified (for rites and duties), holds on to the body owing to the erroneous conception that the body is the Self, and who has the firm conviction, 'I am the agent,' because of the persistence of his idea that the Self is the agent-it is not possible to renounce actions totally, therefore he has competence only for performing enjoined duties by giving up fruits of actions. But he is not to renounce them (actions). In order to point out this idea the Lord says:

18.11 Deha-bhrta, for one who holds on to a body-one who maintains (bibharti) a body (deha) is called a deha-bhrt. One who has self-indentification with the body is called a deha-bhrt, but not a so a man of discrimination; for he has been excluded from the eligibility for agentship by such texts as, 'He who knows this One is indestructible৷৷.' etc. Hence, for that unenlightened person who holds on to the body, he, since; it is na, not; sakyam, possible; tyaktum, to give up, renounce; karmani, actions; asesatah, entirely, totally; therefore the ignorant person who is competent (for rites and duties), yah, who; tu, on the other hand; karma-phala-tyagi, renounces results of actions, relinishes only the hankering for the results of actions while performing the nityakarmas; sah, he; is abhidhiyate, called; tyagi iti, a man of renunciation-even though he continues to be a man of rites and duties. This is said by way of eulogy. Therefore total renunciation of actions is possible only for one who has realized the supreme Truth, who does not hold on to the body, and who is devoid of the idea that the body is the Self. Again, what is that purpose which is accomplished through renunciation of all actions? This is being stated:

18.12 These trividham, threefold-of three kinds; phalam, results; karmanah, of actions characterized as the righteous and the unritheous; anistam, the undesirable, consisting in (birth in) hell, (among) animals, etc.; istam, the desirable, consisting in (birth as) gods and others; and misram, the mixed, having a mixture of the desirable and the undesirable, consisting in (birht as) human beings;-these results that are of these kinds, bhavati, accrues; pretya, after death, after the fall of the body; atyaginam, to those who do not resort to renunciation, to the unilllumined, the men with rites and duties, who are not men of renunciation in the truest sense. The derivative sense of the word phala (pha-la) is this: On accunt of being accomplished through the operation of diverse external accessories, and a result of ignorance, comparable to the charm cast by jugglery, a source of great delusion and appearing as though close to the indwelling Self, it is phalgu (unsubstantial), and as a conseence it undergoes layam (disappearance). (The result that is of this kind accrues to those who do not resort to renunciation). Tu, but; na kvacit, never; sannyasinam, to those who resort tomonasticism for the sake of the highest Reality, to the class of monks called paramahamsas who remain steadfast in Knowledge alone. For, it cannot be that those who are devoted wholly to steadfastness in complete enlightenment do not dig out the seed of transmigration. This is the meaning. Therefore it is only for those who have realized the supreme Truth that it is possible to become a monk who renounces actions totally, because action, accessories and results are superimmpositions on the Self through ignorance. But the renunciation of all actions is not possible for an unenlightened person who perceives the locus (the body etc.), action, agentship and accessories as the Self. This the Lord shows in the following verses:

18.13 O mighty-armed one, nibodha, learn; me, from Me; imani, these; panca, five; karanani, factors, accessories, which are going to be stated-for drawing the attention of his (Arjuna's) mind and for showing the difference among these categories [Categories: locus (body) etc], the Lord praises those accessories in the succeeding verses as fit for being known-; siddhaye, for the accomplishment; sarva-karmanam, of all actions; proktani, which have been spoken of; sankhye, in Vedanta-sankhya is that scripture where the subject-matters [In the sentence, 'Thou art That', the word Thou means the individual Self, and That means Brahman. The comprehension of their unity, and also 'hearing, reflection and meditation' are referred to as the subject-matters.] to be known are fully (samyak) stated (khyayante)-; krtante, in which actions terminate. Krtante alifies that very word (Vedanta). Krtam mean action. That in which occurs the culmination (anta) of that krtam is krtantam, i.e. the termination of actions. In the texts, '৷৷.as much utility as a man has in a well' (2.46), and 'O son of Prtha, all actions in their totality culminate in Knowledge' (4.33), the Lord shows the cessation of all actions when the knowledge of the Self dawns. Hence (it is said): '৷৷.which have been spoken of in that Vedanta where actions culminate and which is meant for the knowledge of the Self.' Which are they? This is being answered:

18.14 Adhisthanam, the locus, the body, which is the seat, the basis, of the manifestation of desire, hatred, happiness, sorrow, knowledge, etc.; tatha, as also karta, the agent, the enjoyer [The individual Self which has intelligence etc. as its limiting adjuncts, due to which it appears to possess their characteristics and become identified with them.] who has assumed the characteristics of the limiting adjuncts; prthak vidham, the different kinds of; karanam, organs, the ears etc. which, twelve [The five organs of knowledge (eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin), the five organs of actions (hands, feet, speech, organ of excertion and that of generation), the mind and the intellect.] in number, are of different kinds for the experience of sound etc.; the vividhah, many; and prthak, distinct; cesta, activities connected with air-exhalation, inhalation, etc.; ca eva, and; daivam, the divine, i.e. the Sun and the others who are the presiding deities of the eye etc.; is atra, here, in relation to these four; pancamam, the fifth-completing the five.

18.15 Yat, whatever; karma, action; narah, a man; prarabhate, performs; with these three-sarira-van-manobhih, with the body, speech and mind; be it nyayyam, just, rigtheous, conforming to the scriptures; va, or; viparitam, its reverse, not conforming to the scriptures, unrighteous; and even such activities like closing the eyes etc. whch are conseent on the fact of living (i.e. instinctive acts)-they also are certainly the result of righteous and unrighteous acts done in earlier lives, and hence they are understood by the very, use of the words 'just and its reverse'-; tasya, of it, of all activities without exception; ete, these; panca, five, as mentioned; are the hetavah, causes. Objection: Well, are not the locus etc. the cause of all actions? Why is it said, '৷৷.performs with the body, speech and mind'? Reply: This fault does not arise. All actions described as 'enjoined' or 'prohibited' are mainly based on the three, body etc. Seeing, hearing, etc., which are characteristics of life and are subsidiaries to these (body etc.) [Seeing etc. are accomplished by the eye etc., which are part and parcel of the body etc.] , are divided into three groups and spoken of in, 'performs with the body,' etc. Even at the time of reaping the fruits (of actions), they are experienced mainly through these (three). Hence, there is no contradiction with the assertion that the five are the causes.

18.16 Tatra is used for connecting with the topic under discussion. Tatra evam sati, this being the case, when actions are thus accomplished by the five causes mentioned above;-this portion has to be connected with 'perverted intellect' by way of causality [Actions are done by the body etc., but since a person thinks that the Self is the agent, therefore he is said to have a perverted intellect.]-yah, tu, anyone, an unenlightened person, who; pasyati, perceives; kevalam, the absolute, pure; atmanam, Self; as the kartaram, agent-thinking, 'I myself am the agent of the actions being done by them', as a conseence of imagining the Self as identified with them; why?-akrta-buddhitvat, owing to the imperfection of his intellect, owing to his intellect not having been refined by the instructions of Vedanta and the teachers, and by reasoning-. Even the person who, believing in the Self as distinct from the body etc., looks upon the distinct [Ast. omits anyam (distinct).-Tr.], absolute Self as the agent, he, too, is surely of imperfect intellect. Hence, owing to his having an imperfect intellect, sah, that man; na, does not; pasyati, perceive (properly) either the truth about the Self or about actions. This is the meaning. Therefore he is a durmatih, man of perverted intellect, in the sense that his intellect is contemptible, perverse, corrupted, and the cause of repeatedly undergoing births and deaths. He does not perceive even while seeing-like the man suffering from Timira seeing many moons, or like one thinking the moon to be moving when (actually) the clouds are moving, or like the one seated on some conveyance (e.g. palanin), thinking oneself to be moving when others (the bearers) are moving. Who, again, is the man of right intellect who perceives correctly? This is being answered:

18.17 Yasya, he who, the person whose intellect is refined by the instructions of the scriptures and the teachers, and reason; who has na, not; ahankrtah bhavah, the feeling of egoism, in whom does not occur the notion in the form, 'I am the agent'; i.e., he who sees thus: 'These five, viz locus etc. (14), imagined in the Self through ignorance, are verily the agents of all actions; not I. But I am the absolute, unchanging witness of their functions, 'Without vita force, without mind, pure, superior to the (other) superior immutable (Maya)" (Mu. 2.1.1)'; yasya, whose; buddhih, intellect, the internal organ, which is the limiting adunct of the Self; is na, not; lipyate, tainted, does not become regretful thinking, 'I have done this; as a result, I shall enter into hell'; whose intellect does not become thus tainted, he has a good intellect and he perceives (rightly). Api, even; hatva, by killing; iman, these; lokan, creatures, i.e. all living beings; sah he; does not hanti, kill-he does not perform the act of killing; nor does he nibadhyate, become bound, nor even does he become connected with its result, the fruit of an unrighteous action. Objection: Even if this be a eulogy, is it not contradictory to say, 'even by killing he does not kill'? Reply: This defect does not arise; for this becomes logical from the ordinary and the enlightened points of view. By adopting the empirical point of view (which consists in thinking), 'I am the slayer', by identifying the body with the Self, the Lord says, 'even by killing'; and, by taking His stand on the supreme Truth as explained above (the Lord says), 'he does not kill, nor does he become bound'. Thus both these surely become reasonable. Objection; Is it not that the Self certainly does act in combination with the locus etc., which conclusion follows from the use of the word kevala (absolute) in the text, 'the absolute Self as the agent' (16)? Reply: There is not such fault, because, the Self being changeless by nature, there is no possiblity of Its becoming united with the locus etc. For it is only a changeful entity that can possibly be united with another, or come to have agentship through combination. But, for the changeless Self there can be no combination with anything whatsoever. Hence, agentship through combination is not logical. Therefore, the absoluteness of the Self being natural, the word kevalam is merely a reiteration of an established fact. And the changelessness of the Self is well known from the Upanisads, the Smrtis and logic. As to that, in the Gita itself this has been established more than once in such texts as, 'It is said that৷৷.This is unchangeable' (2.25), 'Actions are being done by the gunas themselves' (see 3.27), 'this ৷৷.supreme Self does not act৷৷.although existing in the body' (13.31), and in the Upanisads also in such texts as, 'It thinks, as it were, and shakes, as it were' (Br. 4.3.7). And from the standpoint of reason also, the royal path is to hold that the true nature of the Self is that It is partless, independent of others and changeless. Even if mutability (of the Self) be accepted, It should have a change that is Its own. The functions of the locus etc. cannot be attributed to the agency of the Self. Indeed, an action done by someone else cannot be imputed to another by whom it has not been done! As for what is imputed (on somody) through ignorance, that is not his. As the ality of silver is not of nacre, or as surface or dirt attributed through ignorance to the sky by foolish people is not of the sky, similarly, the changes in the locus etc. also are verily their own, and not of the Self. Hence it has been well said that the enlightened person 'does not kill, nor is he bound', becuase of the absence of his being tainted by the idea that actions are done by himself. [Some translate this portion thus: '৷৷.because of the absence of the thought 'I am doing', and also due to the taintlessness of the mind'; or, '৷৷.in the absence of egotism and of all taint in the mind'.-Tr.] After having declared, 'This One does not kill, nor is It killed' (2.19); having stated the immutability of the Self through such texts as, 'Never is this One born' (2.20) , etc., which adduce the reason for this; having briefly stated at the commencement of the Scripture-in, 'he who knows this One as indestructible' (2.21)-that the enlightened man has no eligibility for rites and duties; and having deliberated in various places on that (cessation) which has been mooted in the middle (of the Scripture), the Lord, by way of summarizing the purport of the Scripture, concludes here by saying that the enlightened person 'does not kill, nor does he become bound.' If this be so, then it becomes established that the three kinds of results of actions, viz the undesirable etc., do not accrue to the monks, since it is reasonable that, because of the illogicality of their entertaining the idea of being embodied, all actions resulting from ignorance become abandoned (by them). And hence, as a conseence of a reversal of this, it becomes inevitable that the results do accrue to others. Thus, this is how the purport of the scripture Gita has been summed up. In order that this which is the essence of the teachings of all the Vedas should be. understood after deliberation by the learned ones possessing a sharp intellect, it has been explained by us in accordance with the scriptures and reasoning, in various places by dealing with it topically. Thereafter, now is being stated what promts actions:

18.18 Jnanam, knowledge (-being derived in the sense of 'that through which something is known', jnana means knowledge concerning all things in general-): so also jneyam, the object of knowledge (-that also is a reference to all objects in general-); similarly, parijnata, the knower, the experiencer, a product of ignorance, who partakes of the nature of the limiting adjuncts;-thus, this tripartite group formed by these is the trividha, threefold; karma-codana, inducement ot action, inducer of all actions in general. For, it is when the three, viz knowledge etc., combine that commencement of all actions meant either for acceptance or rejection [Acceptance, rejection or indifference.] are possible. After that, what are initiated by the five, viz locus etc., and are grouped in three ways according to the differences of their being based on speech, mind and body become comprehended under the three, viz instrument etc. This is what is being stated: Karma-sangrahah, the comprehension [It is well know that actions are based on the three-instrument etc.] of actions; iti, comes under; trividhah, three heads, three classes; viz karanam, the instrument (-derived in the sense of that through which anything is done-), i.e. the external (organs) (ear etc.) and the internal (organs) (intellect etc.); karma, the object (-derivatively meaning that which is most cherished by the subject and is achieved through an act-); and karta, the subject (agent), who employs the instrument etc., who partakes of the nature of the limiting adjuncts. Sangrahah is derived thus: that in which something is comprehended. The comprehension of action (karma) is karma-sangrahah. Indeed, action becomes included in these three. Hence is this 'threefold comprehension of action'. Now then, since action, instrument and result are all constituted by the gunas, it becomes necessary to state the three fold variety in them based on the differences among the gunas, viz sattva, rajas and tamas. Hence it is begun:

18.19 Jnanam, knowledge; karma, action-not the objective case in the technical sense, which is defined as 'that which is most cheirshed by the subject'; and karta, agent, the accomplisher of actions; procyate, are stated; guna-sankhyane, in the teaching about the gunas, in the philosophy of Kapila; to be eva, only (-only is used for emphasis, by way of showing that they have no classification other than that based on the gunas-); tridha, of three kinds; guna-bhedatah, according to the differences of the gunas, i.e. according to the differences of sattva etc. Even that philosophy teaching about the gunas is certainly vaild so far as it concerns the experiencer of the gunas, though it is contradictory so far as the non-duality of the supreme Reality, Brahman, is concerned. Those followers of Kapila are acknoweldge authorities in the ascertainment of the functions of the gunas and their derivatives. Hence, that scripture, too, is being referred to by way of eulogy of the subject-matter going to be spoken of. Therefore there is no contradiction. Srnu, hear; tani, about them; api, also; yathavat, as they are, as established by reason and as propounded in the scriptures. Hear about knowledge etc. and all their diversities created by the differences of the gunas. The idea is , 'Concentrate your mind on the subject going to be taught.' And now the threefold classification of knowledge is being stated:

18.20 Viddhi, know; tat, that; jnanam, knowledge, realization of the Self as non-dual, complete realization; to be sattvikam, originating from sattva; yena, through which knowledge; iksate, one sees; ekam, a single; avyayam, undecaying-that which does not undergo mutation either in itself or by the mutation of its alities-' i.e. eternal and immutable; bhavam, Entity-the word bhava is used to imply an entity-, i.e. the single Reality which is the Self; sarvabhutesu, in all things, in all things begining from the Unmanifest to the unmoving things; and through which knowledge one sees that Entity to be avibhaktam, undivided; in every body, vibhaktesu, in all the deversified things, in the different bodies. The idea is: that Reality which is the Self remains, like Space, undivided. Being based on rajas and tamas, those that are the dualistic philosophies are incomplete, and hence are not by themselves adeate for the eradication of worldly existence.

18.21 Tu, but; viddhi, know; tat, that; jnanam, knowledge; to be rajasam, originating from rajas; yat, which; sarvesu bhutesu, amidst all things; vetti, apprehends-since knowledge cannot be an agent of hends-since knowledge cannot be an agent of action, therefore the meaning implied is, 'that, knowledge৷৷.through which one apprehends৷৷.'-; nana-bhavan, the different entities; prthagvidhan, of various kinds, i.e., those possessing diverse characteristics and different from oneself; prthakrvena, as distinct, as separate in each body.

18.22 But tat, that knowledge; is udahrtam, said to be; tamasam, born of tamas; yat, which is; saktam, confined; ekasmin, to one; karye, from, to one body or to an external image etc., krtsnavat, as though it were all, as though it comprehended everything, thinking, 'The Self, or God, is only this much; there is nothing beyond it,'-as the naked Jainas hold that the soul conforms to and has the size of the body, or (as others hold) that God is merely a stone or wood-, remaining confined thus to one form; ahaitukam, which is irrational, bereft of logic; a-tattvarthavat, not concerned with truth-tattvartha, truth, means some-thing just as it is; that (knowledge) which has this (truth) as its object of comprehension is tattvarthavat; that without this is ; a-tattvarthavat-; and which, on account of the very fact of its being irrational, is alpam, trivial, because it is concerned with trifles or is productive of little result. This kind of knowledge is indeed found in non-discriminating creatures in whom tamas predominates. Now is being stated the threehold division of action:

18.23 Niyatam, the daily obligatory; karma, action; yat, which; is krtam, performed; sanga-rahitam, without attachment; araga-dvesatah, without likes or dislikes; aphala-prepsuna, by one who does not hanker for rewards, by an agent who is the opposite of one who is desirous of the fruits of action; tat, that (action); ucyate, is said to be; sattvikam, born of sattva.

18.24 But tat, that; karma, action; udahrtam, is said to be; rajasam, born of rajas; yat, which; is kriyate, done; kamepsuna by one desirous of results; va, or; saahankarena, by one who is egotistic; and bahulaayasam, which is highly strenuous, accomplished by the agent with great effort. 'Egotistic' is not used in contrast to knowledge of Truth. What then? It is used in contrast to the absence of egotism in an ordinary person versed in the Vedic path. For in the case of the knower of the Self, who is not egotistic in the real sense, there is no estion of his being desirous of results or of being an agent of actions reiring great effort. Even of actions born of sattva, the agent is one who has not realized the Self and is possessed of egoism; what to speak of actions born of rajas and tamas! In common parlance, a person versed in the Vedic path, even though not possessing knowledge of the Self, is spoken of as being free from egotism thus-'This Brahmana is free from egotism'. Therefore, 'sahan-karena va' is said in contrast to him only. Punah (again) is used to complete the meter.

18.25 Tat, that; karma, action; yat, which; is arabhyate, undertaken; mohat, out of delusion, non-discrimination; anapeksya, without consideration of; its anubandham, conseence, the result which accrues later; ksayam, loss-that losss which is incurred in the form of loss of energy or loss of wealth in the course of any action; himsam, harm, suffering to creatures; and paurusam, ability, prowess-one's own ability fest as, 'I shall be able to complete this task';-without consideration of these, from 'conseence' to 'ability', ucyate, is said to be; tamasam, born of tamas.

18.26 Karta, the agent; who is mukta-sangah, free from attachment-one by whom attachment has been given up; anahamvadi, not egotisic, not given to asserting his ego; dhrti-utsaha-samanvitah, endowed with fortitude and diligenc; and nirvikarah, unperturbed; siddhi-asiddhyoh, by success and failure, in the fruition and non-fruition of any action under-taken-led only by the authority of the scriptures, not by attachment to results etc. [Etc. stands for attachment to work.];-the agent who is such, he is ucyate, said to be; sattvikah, possessed of sattva.

18.27 Karta, the agent; ragi, who has attachment; karma-phala-prepsuh, who is desirous of the results of actions; lubdhah, covetous, greedy for other's property, and does not part with his own (when) at holy places; himsatmakah, cruel by nature, having a nature that cuases pain to others; asucih, unclean, devoid of internal and external cleanliness; and harsa-soka-anvitah, subject to joy and sorrow, affected by these two, joy and sorrow-joy at the acisition of desired objects, sorrow at getting undesired objects and losing coverted objects; and elation and dejection may occur to that very person from his actions being aided or hindered; one who is subject to those-; parikirtitah, is declared to be; rajasah, possessed of rajas.

18.28 The agent who is ayuktah, unsteady; prakrtah, naive, of very unrefined intelligence, like a child; stabdhah, unbending like a staff-he does not bend down to anyone; sathah, deceitful, cunning, hiding his own powers; naiskrtikah, wicked, given to destroying the livelihood of others; alasah, lazy, not inclined even to his own duties; visadi, morose, ever in a mood of dejection; and dirghasutri, procrastinating, postponing duties for long, [Ast. adds here, 'sarvada mandasvabhavah, always slow by nature'.-Tr.] not accomplishing even in a month what is to be done today or tomorrow;-one who is such, he ucyate, is said to be; tamasah, possessed of tamas.

18.29 O Dhananjaya, srnu, listen; bhedam, to the classification; buddheh, of the intellect; ca eva, as also; the classification dhrteh, of fortitude; trividham, which is threefold; gunatah, according to the gunas, sattva etc. -this much is an apporistic statement-; procyamanam, while it is being stated; asesena, elaborately, just as it is, without omitting anything; and prthaktvena, severally. Arjuna is called Dhananjaya because, in the course of his expedition to coner all the qaurters. he won immense human and divine wealth (dhana).

18.30 O Partha, sa, that; buddhih, intellect; is sattviki, born of sattva; ya, which; vetti, understands; pravrttim, action, the path of rites and duties, which is the cause of bondage; and nivrttim, withdrawal, the path of renunciation, which is the cause of Liberation-since action and withdrawal are mentioned in the same sentence along with bondage and freedom, therefore they mean 'the path of rites and duties and of renunciation'-; karya-akarye, duty and what is not duty, i.e. what is enjoined or prohibited, [Ast. adds laukike vaidike va (ordinary or Vedic injunctions and prohibitions) after vihita-pratisiddhe; and it adds sastrabuddheh before kartavya-akartavye-what ougth to be done or ought not to be done by one who relies on the scriptures.-Tr.] what ought to be done or ought not to be done, action and inaction. With regard to what? With regard to action leading to seen or unseen, results, undertaken according to place, time, etc. Bhaya-abhaye, the sources of fear and fearlessness, i.e. the causes of fear and fearlessness, with regard to seen or unseen objects; bandham, bondage, along with its cause; and moksam, freedom, along with its cause. In this context, knowing is a function of the intellect; but the intellect is the possesser of the function. Fortitude also is only a particular function of the intellect.

18.31 O Partha, sa, that; buddhih, intellect; is rajasi, born of rajas; yaya, with which; prajanati, one understands; ayathavat, wrongly, not truly, not by discerning it from all points of view; dharmam, virtue, as prescribed by the scritpures; and adharmam, vice, what is prohibited by them; [By dharma and adharma are implied the seen and the unseen results of actions as revealed by the scriptures; karya and akarya respectively refer to the actual doing of what ought to be done and the not doing of what ought not to be done.] ca eva, as also; karyam, what ought to be done; and akaryam, what ought not to be done-those very 'duty' and 'what is not duty' as stated earlier.

18.32 O Partha, sa, that; buddhih, intellect; tamasi, is born of tamas; ya, which; tamasavrta, being covered by darkness; manyate, considers, understands; adharmam, vice, what is prohibited; iti, as; dharmam, virtue, what is prescribed; and ca, verily; perceives sarvarthan, all things, all objects of knowledge without exception; viparitan, contrary to what they are.

18.33 O Partha, dhrtya, the firmness; (-is connected with the remote word) avyabhicarinya, that is unfailing; yogena, through concentration, i.e. (the firmness that is) ever associated with samadhi (absorption in Brahman); yaya, with which; dharayate, one restrains;-what?-manah-prana-indriya-kriyah, the functions of the mind, vital forces and organs-restrains them from tending towards the path opposed to the scriptures-. Indeed, when restrained with firmness, they do not incline towards objects prohibited by the scriptures. Sa, that; dhrtih, firmness, which is of this kind; is sattviki, born of sattva. What is mean is that when one restrains the functions of the mind, vital forces and organs with unfailing firmness, one does so through yoga, concentration.

18.34 Tu, but, O Partha; the dhrtya, firmness; yaya, with which; a person dharayate, holds on to; dharma-kama-arthan, righteousness, covetable things and wealth-entertains the conviction in the mind that these ought to be pursued always; and becomes phala-akanksi, desirous of their fruits; prasangena, as the occasion for each arises, according as the situation arises for holding on to any one of dharma etc.; sa, that; dhrtih, firmness; is rajasi, born of rajas.

18.35 That firmness is mata, considered to be; tamasi, born of tamas; yaya, due to which; durmedha, a person with a corrupt intellect; na vimuncati, does not give up-indeed, holds fast to; svapnam, sleep; bhayam, fear; sokam, sorrow; visadam, despondency; eva ca, as also; madam, sensuality, enjoyment of objects-mentally holding these as things that must always be resorted to, considering them to be greatly important to himself, like a drunkard thinking of wine. The threefold division of action as also of agents according to the differences of the gunas has been stated. After that, now is being stated the threefold division of results and happiness:

18.36 Idanim, now; srnu, hear; me, from Me i.e. be attentive to what I say; tu, as regards; the trividham, three kinds of; sukham, joy, O scion of the Bharata dynasty. Yatra, that in which; ramate, one delights, derives pleasure; abhyasat, owing to habit, due to freent repetition; and in the experinece of which joy one nigacchati, certainly attains; duhkhantam, the cessation of sorrow-.

18.37 Yat, that joy which is; iva, like; visam, poison, a source of pain; agre, in the beginning-when it first comes in the early stages of (acisition) of knowledge, detachment, meditation and absorption, since they involve great struggle; but amrtopamam, comparable to nectar; pariname, in the end, when it arises from the maturity of knowledge, detachment, etc.; and which atma-buddhi-prasadajam, arises from the purity (prasada), trasparence like water, of one's intellect (atma-buddhi); tat, that; sukham, joy; is proktam, spoken of, by the learned ones ;as sattvikam, born of sattva. Or, the phrase atma-buddhi-prasadajam may mean 'arising from the high degree of clearness of that atma-buddhi (knowledge of or connected with the Self)'; therefore it is born of sattva.

18.38 Tat, that; sukham, joy; is smrtam, referred to; as rajasam, born of rajas; yat, which; visaya-indriya-samyogat, arising from the contact of the organs and (their) objects; is amrtopamam, like nectar; agre, in the beginning, in the intial moments; but iva, like; visam, poison; pariname, at the end-at the end of full enjoyment of the objects (of the senses), because it causes loss of strength, vigour, beauty, wisdom, [Prajna, the capacity to understand whatever is heard.] retentive faculty, wealth and diligence, and because it is the cause of vice and its conseent hell etc.

18.39 That joy is udahrtam, said to be; tamasam, born of tamas; yat, which; both agre, in the beginning; ca, and; anubandhe, in the seel, after the end (of enjoyment); is mohanam, delusive; atmanah, to oneself; and nidra-alasya-pramada-uttham, arises from sleep, laziness and inadvertence. Therefore, now is begun a verse in order to conclude this section [The section showing that all things in the whole of creation are under the influence of the three gunas.].

18.40 Na asti, there is no; tat, such; sattvam, entity, living creatures like men and others, or non-living things; prthivyam, in the world; va punah, or, again; an entity devesu, among the gods; divi, in heaven; yat, which; syat, can be [-this is connected with the preceding portion 'na tat, there is no such (entity)'-]; muktam, free; hih, from these; trubhih, three; gunaih, gunas, sattva etc.; prakrti-jaih, born of Nature. It has been said that the entire transmigratory state together with its roots, characterized by action, agent and resuls-consisting of the gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas-, and projected by ignorance, is an evil. And this also has been said through the imagery of the Tree in the verse, '৷৷.which has its roots upward' etc. (15.1). It has been further said that, 'after felling that (Tree), with the strong sword of detachment, thereafter, that State has to be sought for' (15.3-4). And, as to that, since all things consist of the three gunas, there arises the impossibility of the eradication of the cause of worldly existence. Hence, it has to be shown how it can be eradicated. Besides, the purport of the scripture Gita has to be summed up, and it has also to be shown that the import of all the Vedas and the Smrtis, which must be put into practice by those who long for the Goal of human life, is verily this much. Hence begin the verses, 'The duties of the Brahmanas, the Ksatriyas and the Vaisyas৷৷.', etc.

18.41 Parantapa, O scorcher of enemies; karmani, the duties; brahmana-ksatriya-visam, of the Brahmanas, the Ksatriyas and the Vaisyas; ca, as also; sudranam, of the Surdras-the Sudras have not been included with the others (in the compund word) because, owing to their having a single birth, [Sudras have no right to be invested with the sacred thread which, in the case of the other three castes, symbolizes a second birth.] they have no right to (the study of) the Vedas; pravibhaktani, have been fully classified, have been prescribed by making distinctions among them;-according to what?-gunahi, according to the gunas; svabhava-prabhavaih, born from Nature. Nature means the Praktrti of God, His Maya consisting of the three gunas. 'Born from Nature' means 'born of these three gunas. In accordnace with these the duties such as control of the internal organs, etc. of the Brahmanas and others have been classified. Or (the meaning is): The source of the nature of the Brahmanas is the ality of sattva. Similarly, the source of the nature of the Ksatriyas is rajas, with sattva as a subordinate (ality); the source of the nature of the Vaisyas is rajas, with tamas as the subordinate (ality); the source of the nature of the Sudras is tamas, with rajas as the subordinate (ality); for the natures of the four are seen to be tranillity. lordliness, industriousness and dullness respectively. Or, svabhava (nature) means the (individual) tendencies of creatures earned in their past lives, which have become manifest in the present life for yielding their own results. The gunas which have that svabhava as their source (prabhava) are svabhava-prabhavah gunah. Since the manifestation of the gunas cannot logically be uncaused, therefore a specific cause [i.e. the tendencies are the efficient cause, and Nature is the material cause.] has been posited by saying that Nature is the cause. Thus, the duties such as control of the internal organs etc. have been classified in keeping with the effects of the gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas, which are born of Nature, born of Prakrti. Objection: Well, are not the duties like controlling the internal organs etc. of the Brahmanas and others classified and enjoined by the scriptures? Why is it said that they are classified according to the gunas sattva etc.? Reply: This objection is not valid. For, the duties like controlling the internal organs etc. of the Brahmanas and others have been classified even by the scriptures verily in keeping with the specific alities sattva etc.; certainly, not without reference to the gunas. Hence, though the duties have been divided by the scriputres, they are said to have been classified according to the gunas. Which, again, are those duties? They are being spoken of:

18.42 Svabhavajam brahma-karma, the natural duties of the Brhamanas, of the Brahmana caste; are samah, control of the internal organs; damah, control of the external organs-these bear the meanings as explained earlier (see 6.3, 10.4, 16.1); tapah, austerity-bodily austerity, as explained before (17.14); saucam, purity, as already explained (in 13.7, 16.3); ksantih, forgiveness; arjavam, straightforwardness, simplicity; jnanam, knowledge; eva ca, as also vijnanam, wisdom; astikyam, faith, the idea of truth [Truth of the scritpures, existence of God, etc. In place of asti-bhavah Ast reads astika-bhavah, the feeling of conviction with regard to the existence of God and the other world. Tr.] respect for the teaching of the scriptures. By svabhavajam (natural) is conveyed the very same idea as was expressed in 'classified according to the gunas born from Nature' (41).

18.43 Svabhavajam, the natural; ksatra-karma, [A variant reading is ksatram karma.-Tr.] enjoined duties of the Ksatriyas, of the Ksatriya caste; are sauryam, heroism; tejah, boldness; dhrtih, fortitude, as is seen in the case of one who is not depressed under all circumstances, being sustained by doggedness; daksyam, capability engagement without confusion in duties which suddenly present them-selves; api ca, and also; apalayanam, not retreating; yuddhe, from battle, not fleeing from enemies; danam, generosity, being free in the distribution of gifts; isvarabhavah, lordliness, manifesting (exercising) rulership over those who have to be ruled.

18.44 Svabyavajam, the natural; vaisya-karma, duties of the Vaisyas, of the Vaisya caste; are krsi-gauraksyavanijyam, agriculture, cattle rearing and trade: Krsi is tilling of land. Orre who rears cattle (go) is goraksa; the abstract form of that word is gauraksyam, animal-husbandry. Vanijyam means the occupation of a trader, consisting of buying and selling. Sudrasya, of the Sudra; api, too; svabhavajam, the natural; karma, duty; is paricaryatmakam, in the form of service. When rightly pursued, the natural result of these duties enjoined for the castes is the attainment of heaven-which act is evident from such Smrti texts as, 'People belonging to the castes and stages of life, who are true to their own duties, experience after death the fruit of their actions. And after that, as a result of the remnants of their merits they are born in some excellent region, caste and family, with greater piety, longevity, learning, conduct, wealth, happiness and intelligence' (Ap. Dh. Su. 2.2.2.3), etc. And in the Puranas also it is particularly mentioned that poeple belonging to the (different) castes and stages of life come to have specific results in the form of different worlds. But this result that is going to be stated follows from a different cause:

18.45 Sve sve karmani abhiratah, being devoted to his own duty, which has different characteristics as stated above; narah, man, the person alified therefor; labhate, attains; samsiddhim, complete success, characterized as the ability for steadfastness in Knowledge, which follows from the elimination of the impurities of body and mind as a result of fulfilling his own duty. Does the complete success follow merely from the fulfilment of one's own duty? No. How then? Srnu, hear; tat, that; yatha, as to how, through what means; sva-karma-niratah, one devoted to his own duty; vindati, acheives; siddim, success.

18.46 Manavah, a human being; vindati, achieves; siddhim, success, merely in the form of the ability for steadfastness in Knowledge; abhyarcya, by adoring, worshipping; svakarmana, with his own duties stated above, as allotted to each caste; tam, Him, God; yatah, from whom, from which God; comes pravrttih, origin,-or, from which internal Ruler comes the activities; ;bhutanam, of creatures, of living beings; and yena, by whom, by which God; is tatam, pervaded; sarvam, all; idam, this world. Since this is so, therefore,

18.47 Svadharmah, one's own duty; though vigunah, defective-the word though has to be supplied-; is sreyan, superior to, more praiseworthy than; paradharmat, another's duty; su-anusthitat, well performed. Kurvan, by performing; karma, a duty; svabhavaniyatam, as dictated by one's own nature-this phrase means the same as svabhavajam (born from Nature) which has been stated earlier-; na apnoti, one does not incur; kilbisam, sin. As poison is not harmful to a worm born it it, so one does not incur sin by performing a duty dictated by one's own nature. It has been siad that, as in the case of a worm born in poison, a person does not incur sin while performing his duties which have been dictated by his own nature; and that someone else's duty is fraught with fear; also that, one who does not have the knoweldge of the Self, (he) surely cannot remain even for a moment without doing work (cf. 3.5). Hence-

18.48 Kaunteya, O son of Kunti; na tyajet, one should not give up;-what?-the karma, duty; sahajam, to which one is born, which devolves from the very birth; api, even though; it be sadosam, faulty, consisting as it is of the three gunas. Hi, for; sarva-arambhah, all undertakings (-whatever are begun are arambhah, i.e. 'all actions', according to the context-), being constituted by the three gunas (-here, the fact of being constituted by the three gunas is the cause-); are avrtah, surrounded; dosena, with evil; iva, as;; agnih, fire; is dhumena, with smoke, which comes into being concurrently. One does not get freed from evil by giving up the duty to which one is born-called one's own duty-, even though (he may be) fulfilling somody else's duty. Another's duty, too, is fraught with fear. The meaning is: Since action cannot be totally given up by an unelightened person, therefore he should not relinish it. Opponent: Well, is it that one should not abandon action because it cannot be given up completely, or is it because evil [Evil resulting from discarding daily obligatory duties.] follows from the giving up of the duty to which one is born? Counter-objection: What follows from this? Opponent: If it be that the duty to which one is born should not be renounced because it is impossible to relinish it totally, then the conclusion that can be arrived at is that complete renunciation (of duty) is surely meritorious! Counter-objection: Truly so. But, may it not be that total relinishment is itself an impossibility? Is a person ever-changeful like the gunas of the Sankhyas, or is it that action itself is the agent, as it is in the case of the momentary five [Rupa (from), vedana (feeling), vijnana (momentary consciousness), sanjna (notion), samskara (mental impressions)-these have only momentary existence. In their case there can be no distinction between action and agent, simply due to the fact of their being momentary.] forms of mundane consciousness propounded by the Buddhists? In either case there can be no complete renunciation of action. Then there is also a third standpoint (as held by the Vaisesikas): When a thing acts it is active, and inactive when that very thing does not act. If this be the case here, it is possible to entirely give up actions. But the speciality of the third point of view is that a thing is not ever-changing, nor is action itself the agent. What then? A nonexistent action originates in an existing thing, and an existing action gets destroyed. The thing-in-itself continues to exist along with its power (to act), and that itself is the agent. This is what the followers of Kanada say. [Their view is that agentship consists in 'possessing the power to act', not in being the substratum of action.] What is wrong with this point of view. Vedantin: The defect indeed lies in this that, this veiw is not in accord with the Lord's view. Objection: How is this known? Vedantin: Since the Lord as said, 'Of the unreal there is no being৷৷.,' etc. (2.16). The view of the followers of Kanada is, indeed, this that the non-existent becomes existent, and the existent becomes nonexistent. Objection: What defect can there be if it be that this view, even though not the view of the Lord, yet conforms to reason? Vedantin: The answer is: This is surely faulty since it contradicts all valid evidence. Objection: How? Vedantin: As to this, if things like a dvyanuka (dyad of two anus, atoms) be absolutely nonexistent before origination, and after origination continue for a little while, and again become absolutely non-existent, then, in that acase, the existent which was verily nonexistent comes into being, [Here Ast. adds, 'sadeva asattvam apadyate, that which is verily existent becomes nonexistent'.-Tr.] a non-entity becomes an entity, and an entity becomes a non-entity! If this be the view, then the non-enity that is to take birth is comparable to the horns of a hare before it is born, and it comes into being with the help of what are called material (inherent), non-mateial (non-inherent) and efficient causes. But it cannot be said that nonexistence has origination in this way, or that it depends on some cause, since this is not seen in the case of nonexistent things like horns of a hare, etc. If such things as pot etc. which are being produced be of the nature of (potentially) existing things, then it can be accepted that they originate by depending on some cause which merely manifests them. [According to Vedanta, before origination a thing, e.g. a pot, remains latent in its material cause, clay for instance, with its name and form unexpressed, and it depends on other causes for the manifestation of name and form.] Moreover, if the nonexistent becomes existent, and the existent becomes non-existent, then nobody will have any faith while dealing with any of the means of valid knowledge objects of such knowledge, because the conviction will be lacking that the existent is existent and the nonexistent is nonexistent! Further, when they speak of origination, they (the Viasesikas) hold that such a thing as a dvyanuka (dyad) comes to have relationship with its own (material) causes (the two atoms) and existence, and that it is nonexistent before origination; but later on, depending on the operation of its own causes, it becomes connected with its own causes, viz the atoms, as also with existence, through the inherent (or inseparable) relationship called samavaya. After becoming connected, it becomes an existent thing by its inherent relationship with its causes. [The effect (dyad) has inherent relationship with existence after its material causes (the two atoms) come into association.] It has to be stated in this regard as to how the nonexistent can have an existent as its cuase, or have relationship with anything. For nobody can establish through any valid means of knowledge that a son of a barren woman can have any existence or relationship or cause. Vaisesika: Is it not that relationship of a non-existent thing is not at all established by the Vaisesikas? Indeed, what is said by them is that only existent entities like dvyanuka etc. have the relationship in the form of samavaya with their own causes. Vedantin: No, for it is not admitted (by them) that anything has existence before the (samavaya) relationship (occurs). It is surely not held by the Vaisesikas that a pot etc. have any existence before the potter, (his) stick, wheel, etc. start functioning. Nor do they admit that clay itself takes the shape of a pot etc. As a result, it has to be admitted (by them) as the last aternative that nonexistence itself has some relationship! Vaisesika: Well, it is not contradictory even for a nonexistent thing to have the relationship in the form of inherence. Vedantin: No, because this is not seen in the case of a son of a barren woman etc. If the antecedent nonexistence (prag-abhava) of the pot etc. alone comes into a relationship with its own (material) cause, but not so the nonexistence of the son of a barren woman etc. though as nonexistence both are the same, then the distinction between the (two) nonexistences has to be explained. Through such descriptions ( of abhava, nonexistence) as nonexistence of one, nonexistence of two, nonexistence of all, antecedent nonexistence, nonexistence after destruction, mutual nonexistence and absolute non-existence, nobody can show any distinction (as regards nonexistence itself)! There being no distinction, (therefore, to say that:) 'it is only the "antecedent nonexistence" of the pot which takes the form of the pot through the (action of) the potter and others, and comes into a relationship with the existing pot-halves which are its own (material) causes and becomes fit for all empirical processes [Such as production, destruction, etc.] but the "nonexistence after destruction" of that very pot does not do so, though it, too, is nonexistence. Hence, the "nonexistence after destruction", etc. [Etc. stands for 'mutual nonexistence (anyonya-abhava)' and 'absolute nonexistence (atyanta-abhava)'.] are not fit for any empirical processes, whereas only the "antecedent nonexistence" of things called dvyanuka etc. is fit for such empirical processes as origination etc.'-all this is incongruous, since as nonexistence it is indistinguishable, as are 'absolute nonexistence' and 'nonexistence after destruction'. Vaisesika: Well, it is not at all said by us that the 'antecedent nonexistence' becomes existent. Vedantin: In that case, the existent itself becomes existent , as for instance, a pot's becoming a pot, or a cloth's becoming a cloth. This, too, like nonexistence becoming existent, goes against valid evidence. Even the theory of transformation held by the Sankhyas does not differ from the standpoint of the Vaisesikas, since they believe in the origination of some new attribute [i.e. in the origination of a transformation that did not exist before.] and its destruction. Even if manifestation and disappearance of anything be accepted, yet there will be contradiction with valid means of knowledge as before in the explanation of existence or nonexistence of manifestation and disappearance. Hery is also refuted the idea that origination etc. (of an effect) are merely particular states of its cuase. As thelast alternative, it is only the one entity called Existence that is imagined variously through ignorance to be possessed of the states of origination, destruction, etc. like an actor (on a stage). This veiw of the Lord has been stated in the verse, 'Of the unreal there is no being৷৷.' (2.16). For, the idea of existence is constant, while the others are inconstant. Objection: If the Self be immutable, then how does the 'renunciation of all actions' become illogical? Vedantin: If the adjuncts (i.e. body and organs) be real or imagined through ignorance, in either case, action, which is their attribute, is surely superimposed on the Self through ignorance. From this point of view it has been said that an unenlightened person is incapable of totally renouncing actions even for a moment (cf. 3.5). The enlightened person, on the other hand, can indeed totally renounce actions when ignorance has been dispelled through Illumination; for it is illogical that there can (then) remain any trace of what has been superimposed through ignorance. Indeed, no trace remains of the two moons, etc. superimposed by the vision affected by (the disease called) Timira when the desease is cured. This being so, the utterance, 'having given up all actions mentally' (5.13), etc. as also, 'Being devoted to his own duty' (45) and 'A human being achieves 'success by adoring Him through his own duties (46), becomes justifiable. What was verily spoken of as the success arising from Karma (-yoga), characterized as the fitness for steadfastness in Knowledge,-the fruit of that (fitness), characterized as 'steadfastness in Knowledge' consisting in the perfection in the form of the state of one (i.e. a monk) free from duties, has to be stated. Hence the (following) verse is begun:

18.49 Asakta-buddhih, he whose intellect, the internal organ, remains unattached; sarvatra, to everything, with regard to son, wife and others who are the cuases of attachment; jitatma, who has conered his internal organs; and vigata-sprhah, who is desireless, whose thirst for his body, life and objects of enjoyment have been eradicated;-he who is such a knower of the Self, adhigaccahti, attains; sannyasena, through monasticism, through perfect knowledge or through renunciation of all actions preceded by this knowledge; the paramam, supreme, most excellent; naiskarmya-siddhim, perfection consisting in the state of one free from duties. One is said to be free from duties from whom duties have daparted as a result of realizing that the actionless Brahman is his Self; his state is naiskarmyam. That siddhi (perfection) which is this naiskarmya is naiskarmya-siddhi. Or, this phrase means 'achievement of naiskarmya', i.e., achievement of the state of remaining established in one's own real nature as the actionless Self-which is different from the success arising from Karma (-yoga), and is of the form of being established in the state of immediate Liberation. Accordingly has it been said, '৷৷.having given up all actions mentally,৷৷.without doing or causing (others) to do anything at all' (5.13). The stages through which one who has attained success-which has the aforesaid characteristics and which arises from the performance of one's own duties mentioned earlier as worship of God-, and in whom has arisen discriminative knowledge, achieves perfection-in the form of exclusive adherence to Knowledge of the Self and consisting in the state of one free from duties-have to be stated. With this is view the Lord says:

18.50 Nibodha, understand for certain; me, from Me, from My utterance-. Is it elaborately? The Lord says, no, samasena, in brief; eva, indeed, O son of Kunti, how siddhim praptah, one who has achieved success, one who, by worshipping God through one's duties, has achieved success in the form of fitness of the body and organs for steadfastness in Knowledge, which comes from His grace; (-the reiteration of the phrase siddhim praptah is meant for introducing what follows; what is that succeeding subject for which this reiteration stands is being answered:) yatha tatha, that process by which, that process in the form of steadfastness in Knowledge, by which that process of aciring steadfastness in Knowledge by which; apnoti, attains; brahma, Brahman, th supreme Self-. In order to point out-as 'It is this'-the realization of Brahman which was promised in, 'that process by which one৷৷.attains Brahman,' the Lord says; ya, which; is the para, supreme; nistha, consummation, i.e. the supreme culmination; jnanasya, of Knowledge. Of what? Of the knowledge of Brahman. Of what kind is it? It is of the same kind as the realization of the Self. Of what kind is that? As is the Self. Of what nature is It? As has been described by the Lord and the Upanisadic texts, and established through reason. Objection: Is it not that knowledge takes the form of its object? But it is not admitted anywhere that the Self is an object, or even that It has form. Pseudo-Vedantin: Is it not heard of in such texts as, 'radiant like the sun' (Sv. 3.8), 'Of the nature of effulgence' (Ch. 3.14.2) and 'Self-effulgent' (Br. 4.3.9), that the Self has form? Objection: No, because those sentences are meant for refuting the idea that the Self is of the nature of darkness. When the Self is denied of possessing forms of substance, ality, etc., the contingency arises of the Self's being of the nature of darkness. The sentences, 'radiant like the sun,' etc. are meant for ruting this. And this follows from the specific denial of from by saying, 'Formless' (Ka. 1.3.15), and from such texts as, 'His form does not exist within the range of vision; nobody sees Him with the eye' (Ka. 2.3.9: Sv. 4.20), 'soundless, touchless' (ka. 1.3.15), etc. which show that the Self is not an object of perception. Therefore it remains unproved that there can be any knowledge which takes the form of the Self. How, then, can there be the knowledge of the Self? For, all knowledge that there can be with regard to objects assumes their respective forms. And it has been said that the Self has no form. Moreover, if both knowledge and the Self be formless, then how can there be the consummation [Firmness in Self-realization.] of the (repeated) contemplation on that (knowledge of the Self)? Vedantin: No. Since it can be established that the Self is supremely taintless, pure and subtle, and it can also be established that the intellect can have taintlessness etc. like the Self, therefore it stands to reason that the intellect can take a form resembling the consciousness of the Self. The mind becomes impressed with the semblance of the intellect; the organs become impressed with the semblance of the mind; and the body becomes impressed with the semblance of hte organs. Hence it is that the idea of the body itself being the Self is held by ordinary people. The Lokayatikas (materialists), who hold that the body is identical with consciousness, say that a person is a body endowed with consciousness; so also there are others who say that the organs are identical with consciousness; there are others who say that the mind is identical with consciousness, and still others who say that the intellect is identical with consciousness. Some accept as the Self the Unmanifest [The inmost Ruler (antaryamin), possessing a semblance of Consciousness.], called the Undifferentiated, which is more internal than that (intellect) and is within the domain of (primordial) ignorance. Indeed, in every case, beginning from the intellect to the body, the cause of mis-conceived Selfhood is the semblance of the Consciousness that is the Self. Hence, knowledge about the Self is not a subject for injunction. What then? Only the eradication of the superimposition of name, form, etc., which are not the Self, is what has to be undertaken, but not the knowledge of the Self that is Consciousness. For it is the Self which is experienced as possessed of the forms of all the various objects that are superimposed (on It) through ignorance. It is evidently because of this that the Buddhists who uphold the view of (momentary) consciousness have concluded that there is no substance at all apart from (momentary) consciousness, and that it is not in need of any other valid proof since they hold that it is self-cognized. Therefore, what is to be undertaken is only the elimination of the superimposition on Brahman through ignorance, but no effort is needed for knowing Brahman (Consciousness), for It is ite self-evident! It is because the intellect is distracted by particular appearances of name and form imagined through ignorance that Brahman, even though self-evident, easily realizable, nearer than all else and identical with oneself, appears to be concealed, difficult to realize, very far and different, But to those whose intellect has become free from external appearances and who have obtained the grace of a teacher and serenity of mind, there is nothing more blissful, manifest, well known, easily realized and nearer to oneself than this Self. And thus it has been declared, 'directly realizable, righteous,' etc. (9.2). However, some wiseacres assert that the intellect cannot comprehend the entity called the Self since It is formless; hence, complete steadfastness in Knowledge is impossible. This is truly so for those who have not associated with a traditional line of teachers; who have not heard the Upanisads; whose intellects are too much engrossed with external objects; and who have not applied themselves diligently to the perfect means of knowledge. For those, on the other hand, who are the opposite of these, it is absolutely impossible to have the idea of reality with regard to empirical objects, which are within the realm of duality involving the knower and the known, because in their case there is no perception of any other thing apart from the Consciousness that is the Self. We have already said how this is certainly so and not otherwise. It has been stated by the Lord also, 'That during which creatures keep awake, it is night to the seeing sage' (2.69). Therefore, the cessation of the perception of differences in the form of external things is alone the cause of resting in the reality of the Self. For, that which is called the Self is never an object which is not well known, attainable, rejectable or acceptable to anyone at any time. Were that Self to be indeed not self-evident, all activities would become meaningless. [According to Ast. the latter portion of this sentence is: svarthah sarvah pravrttayah vyarthah prasajyeran, all activities meant for one's own benefit would become meaningless.-Tr.]. For it cannot be imagined that they could be undertaken for unconscious objects like the body etc. Besides, it cannot be that pleasure is for pleasure's sake, or that sorrow is for sorrow's sake. Moreover, all empirical dealings are meant for culminating in the realization of the Self. [According to B.S. 3.4.26, 'On the strength of the Upanisadic sanction of sacrifices etc. all religious activities as well are necessary৷৷.', sacrifices etc. are meant for leading to the realization of the Self, without which they would become meaningless.] Therefore, just as for knowing one's own body there is no need of any other (external) means of knowledge so also there is no need of any other means of knowledge, for the realization of the Self which is innermost (in relation to the body etc.). Hence it is established that steadfastness in the knowledge of the Self is a fact very well known to the discriminating people. Even to those who hold that knowledge is formless and not cognized by direct perception, cognition of an object is dependent on knowledge. Hence it has to be admitted that knowledge is as immediate as pleasure etc. And this follows also from the impossibility of a desire to know (knowledge). Had knowledge been not self-evident, it could have been sought for like any object of knowledge. And in that case, as [This is Ast.'s reading; others read tatha.-Tr.] a knower seeks to perceive through knowledge such objects of knowledge as pot etc., similarly the knower would have sought to perceive knowledge through another knowledge! But this is not the case. Therefore knowledge is ite self-revealing, and for the very same reason the knower also is self-revealed. Hence, effort is not needed for knowledge, but only for the removal of the notion of what is not-Self. [In place of anatma-buddhi-nivrttau, Ast. has 'anatmani atma-buddhi-nivrttau, for the termination of thinking what is not the Self as the Self'.-Tr.] Conseently, steadfastness in Knowledge is easy of accomplishment. It is being stated how this supreme consummation of Knowledge is to be attained:

18.51 Yuktah, being endowed; buddhya, with an intellect-which is identical with the faculty of determination; visuddhaya, pure, free from maya (delusion); and niyamya, controlling, subduing; atmanam, oneself, the aggregate of body and organs; dhrtya, with fortitude, with steadlines; tyaktva, rejecting; visayan, the objects; sabdadin, beginning from sound -from the context it follows that 'rejecting the objects' means rejecting all things which are meant for pleasure and are in excess of those meant only for the mere maintenance of the body; and vyudasya, eliminating; raga-dvesau, attachment and hatred with regard to things which come to hand for the maintenance of the body-. Therefore,

18.52 Vivikta-sevi, one who resorts to solitude, is habituated to repairing into such solitary places as a forest, bank of a river, mountain caves, etc.; laghuasi, eats sparingly, is habituated to eating a little-repairing to solitary places and eating sparingly are nentioned here since they are the causes of tranillity of mind through the elimination of defects like sleep etc.-; the person steadfast in Knowledge, yata-vak-kaya-manasah, who has speech, body and mind under control. Having all his organs withdrawn thus, dhyana-yoga-parah nityam, one to whom meditation and concentration are ever the highest (duty)-meditation is thinking of the real nature of the Self, and concentration is making the mind one-pointed with regard to the Self itself; one to whom these meditation and concentration are the highest (duty) is dhyana-yoga-parah-. Nityam, (ever) is used to indicate the absence of other duties like repetition of mantra [A formula of prayer sacred to any deity.-V.S.A.] etc. Samupasritah, one who is fully possessed, i.e. ever possessed; of vairagyam, dispassion, absence of longing for objects seen or unseen-. Further,

18.53 (That person) vimucya, having discarded; ahan-karam, egotism, thinking of the body, organs, etc. as the ego; balam, force-which is associated with desire and attachment; not the other kind of strength consisting in the fitness of the body etc., becuase being natural it cannot be descarded-; darpam, pride, which follows elation and leads to transgresson of righteousness-for the Smrti says, 'An elated person becomes proud; a proud man transgresses righteousness' (Ap. Dh. Su. 1.13.4); kamam, desire; krodham, anger, aversion; parigraham, superfluous possessions-even after removing the defects in the organs and the mind, there arises the possibility of acceptance of gifts either for the maintenance of the body or for righteous duties; discarding them as well, i.e. becoming a mendicant of the param-hamsa class; nirmamah, free from the idea of possession, becoming devoid of the idea of 'me' and 'mine' even with regard to so much as one's body and life; and for the very same reason, santah, serene, withdrawn; the monk who is effortless and steadfast in Knowledge, kalpate, becomes fit; brahma-bhuyaya, for becoming Brahman.

18.54 Brahma-bhutah, one who has become Brahman, attained Brahman through the above process; and prasanna-atma, [Prasada means the manifestation of the supreme Bliss of the Self as a result of the total cessation of all evils. Prasanna-atma is one who has attained this in the present life itself.] has attained the blissful Self, the indwelling Self; na, does not; socati, grieve-does not lament for the loss of something or the lack of some ality in oneself; nor kanksati, desire. By saying 'he does not grieve nor desire', this nature of one who has attained Brahman is being restated. For it does not stand to reason that in the case of a knower of Brahman there can be any hankering for something unattained. Or, (in place of kanksati) teh reading may be na hrsyati, does not become elated. Becoming samah, the same; sarvesu bhutesu, towards all being-i.e., he verily judges what is happiness and sorrow in all beings by the same standard as he would apply to himself (cf. 6.32); but the meaning is not 'seeing the Self alike in all beings', for this will be spoken of in (the next verse), 'Through devotion he knows Me'-; he, the one who is of this kind and steadfast in Knowledge, labhate, attains; param, supreme; madbhaktim, devotion to Me, to the supreme Lord; (he attains) devotion which is described as Knowledge, as the 'fourth' in, '৷৷.four classes of people৷৷.adore Me' (7.16). Then,

18.55 Bhaktya, through devotion, through that devotion described as Knowledge; abhijanati, he knows; mam, Me; tattvatah, in reality; as to yavan, what I am, with the extensive differences created by limiting adjuncts; and yah asmi, who I am when all distinctions create by the limiting adjuncts are destroyed-Me who am the supreme Person comparable to space [In points of all-pervasiveness and non-attachment.] and one-without-a-second, absolute, homogeneous Consciousness, birthless, ageless, immortal, fearless and deathless. Tatah, then; jnatva, having known; mam, Me, thus; tattvatah, in truth; visate, he enters into Me, Myself; tadanantaram, immediately after that (Knowledge). Here, by saing, 'having known, he enters without delay', it is not meant that the acts of 'knowing' and 'entering immediately after' are different. What then? What is meant is the absolute Knowledge itself that has to no other result, [In place of phalantarabhava-jnana-matram eva, Ast. reads 'phalantarbhavat jnanamatram eva, absolute Knowledge itself, since there is no other result'.-Tr.] for it has been said, 'And৷৷.understand Me to be the "Knower of the field", (13.2). Opponent: Has it not been contradictory to say, he knows Me through that which is the supreme steadliness (nistha) in Knowledge? Vedantin: If it be asked, How it is contradictory? Opponent: The answer is: Whenever any Knowledge of something arises in a knower, at that very moment the knower knows that object. Hence, he does not depend on steadfastness in Knowledge which consists in the repetition of the act of knowing. And therefore, it is contradictory to say one knows not through knowledge, but through steadfastness in knowledge which is a repetition of the act of knowing. Vedantin: There is no such fault, since the culmination of Knowledge-which (Knowledge) is associated with the causes of its unfoldment and maturity, and which has nothing to contradict it- in the conviction that one's own Self has been realized is what is referred to by the word nistha (consummation): When knowledge-which concerns the identity of the 'Knower of the field' and the supreme Self, and which remains associated with the renunciation of all actions that arise from the perception of the distinction among their accessories such as agent etc., and which unfolds from the instruction of the scriptures and teachers, depending on purity of the intellect etc. and humility etc. which are the auxiliary cuases of the origin and maturity of Knowledge-continues in the form of the conviction that one's own Self has been realized, then that continuance is called the supreme steadfastness (nistha) in Knowledge. This steadfastness in Knowledge that is such has been spoken of as the highest, the fourth kind of devotion in relation to the three other devotions viz of the afflicted, etc. (cf. 7.16). Through that highest devotion one realizes the Lord in truth. Immediately after that the idea of difference between the Lord and the Knower of the field vanishes totally. There-fore the statement, 'one knows Me through devotion in the form of steadfastness in Knowledge', is not contradictory. And, in this sense, all the scriptures-consisting of Vedanta (Upanisads etc.), History, Mythology and Smrtis-, as for instance, 'Knowing (this very Self the Brahmanas) renounce৷৷.and lead a mendicant's life' (Br. 3.5.1), 'Therefore they speak of monasticism as excellent among these austerities' (Ma. Na. 24.1), 'Monasticism verily became supreme' (ibid. 21.2), which enjoin renunciation become meaningful. Thus, monasticism means renunciation of rites and duties. There are also the texts, 'Having renounced the Vedas as well as this world and the next' (Ap. Dh. Su. 2.9.13), and 'Give up religion and irreligion' (Mbh. Sa. 329.40; 331.44), etc. And here (in the Gita) also various relevant) passages have been pointed out. In is not porper that those texts should be meaningless. Nor are they merely eulogistic, since they occur in their own contexts. Besides, Liberation consists in being established in the changeless real nature of the indwelling Self. Indeed, it is not possible that one who wants to go to the eastern sea and the other who wants to go in the opposite direction to the western sea can have the same course! And steadfastness in Knowledg consists in being totally absorbed in maintaining a current of thought with regard to the indwelling Self. And that is opposed to coexistence with duties, like going to the western sea. It has been the conclusion of those versed in the valid means of knowledge that the difference between them is as wide as that between a mountain and a mustard seed! Therefore it is established that one should have recourse to steadfastness in Knowledge only, by relinishing all rites and duties. The fruit of the attainment of success from the Yoga of Devotion consisting in worshiping the Lord with one's own actions is the ability to remain steadfast in Knowledge, from which, follows stead-fastness in Knowledge, culminating in the result, Liberation. That Yoga of Devotion to the Lord is now being praised in this concluding section dealing with the purport of the Scripture, with a veiw to generating a firm conviction with regard to it (the purport of the Scripture):

18.56 Sada, ever; kurvanah api, engaging even in; sarva-karmani, all actions, even the prohibited ones; madvyapasrayah, one to whom I am the refuge, to whom I, Vasudeva the Lord, am the refuge, i.e. one who has totally surrendered himself to Me; even he, apnoti, attains; the sasvatam, eternal; avyayam, immutable; padam, State of Visnu; mat-prasadat, through My, i.e. God's, grace. Since this is so, therefore,

18.57 Cetasa, mentally, with a discriminating intellect; sannyasya, surrendering; sarva-karmani, all actions meant for seen or unseen results; mayi, to Me, to God, in the manner described in, 'Whatever you do, whatever you eat' (9.27); and matparah, accepting Me as the supreme-you to whom I, Vasudeva, am the supreme, are matparah; becoming so; satatam, ever; maccittah bhava, have your kind fixed only on Me; upasritya, by resorting-resorting implies not taking recourse to anything else-; buddhi-yogam, to the concentration of your intellect. Having the intellect (buddhi) concentrated on Me is buddhi-yoga.

18.58 Maccittah, having your mind fixed on Me; tarisyasi, you will cross over; sarva-durgani, alldifficulties, all cuases of transmigration which are difficult to overcome; mat-prasadat, through My grace. Atha cet, if, on the other hand; tvam, you; na srosyasi, will not listen to, will not accept, My words; ahankarat, out of egotism, thinking 'I am learned'; then vinanksyasi, you will get destroyed, will court ruin. And this should not be thought of by you-'I am independent. Why should I follow another's bidding?'

18.59 Yat, that; manyase, you think, resolve; this-'na yotsye, I shall not fight'; asritya, by relying; on ahankaram, egotism, mithya, vain; is esah, this; vyava-sayah, determination; te, of yours; because prakrtih, nature, your own nature of a Ksatriya; niyoksyati, will impell; ;tvam, you!

18.60 And because of nibaddhah, being securely bound; svena, by your own; karmana, duty; svabhavajena, born of nature [Svabhava means those tendencies which are created by good bad actions performed in previous births, and which become the cause of performance of duties, renunciation, experience of happiness, sorrow, etc. in the present birth.-S.]-herosim etc. as stated (in 43); O son of Kunti, you avasah, being helpless, under another's control; karisyasi api, will verily do; tat, that duty; yat, which duty; you na, do not; icchasi, wish; kartum, to do; mohat, owing to indiscrimination. For,

18.61 Arjuna, O Arjuna-one whose self is naturally white (pure), i.e. one possessing a pure internal organ. This follows from the Vedic text, 'The day is dark and the day is arjuna (white) (Rg. 6.9.1). Isvarah, the Lord , Narayana the Ruler; tisthati, resides, remains seated; hrd-dese, in the region of the heart; sarva-bhutanam, of all creatures, of all living beings. How does He reside? In answer the Lord says: bhramayan, revolving; mayaya, through Maya, through delusion; sarva-bhutani, all the creatures; as though yantra-arudhani, mounted on a machine-like man' etc., made of wood, mounted on a machine. The word iva (as though) has to be thus understood here. Bhramayan, revolving, is to be connected with tisthati, resides (conveying the idea, 'resides৷৷.while revolving').

18.62 Gaccha saranam, take refuge; tam eva, in Him, the Lord alone; sarva-bhavena, with your whole being, for getting rid of your mundane sufferings, O scion of the Bharata dynasty. Tat-prasadat, through His grace, through God's grace; prapsyasi, you will attain; param, the supreme; santim, Peace, the highest Tranillity; and the sasvatam, eternal; sthanam, Abode, the supreme State of Mine who am Visnu.

18.63 Te, to you; akhyatam, has been imparted, spoken of; maya, by Me who am the omniscient God; iti, this; jnanam, knowledge; which is guhyataram, more secret; guhyat, than any secret-i.e. it is extremely profound, mystical. Vimrsya, pondering over, contemplating on; etat, this, the Scripture as imparted; asesena, as a whole, and also on all the subjects dealt with; kuru, do; yatha icchasi tatha, as you like. 'Once again, hear what is beng said by Me:'

18.64 Srnu, listen; bhuyah, again; to me, My; paramam, highest; vacah, utternace; which is sarva-guhyatamam, profundest of all, most secret of all secrets, though it has been repeatedly stated. Neither from fear nor even for the sake of money am I speaking! What then? Iti, since, considering that; asi, you are; drdham, ever, unwaveringly; istah, dear; me, to Me; tatah, therefore, for that reason; vaksyami, I shall speak; what is hitam, beneficial; te, to you, what is the highest means of attaining Knowledge. That is indeed the most beneficial of all beneficial things. 'What is that (You are going to tell me)?' In answer the Lord says:

18.65 Bhava manmana, have your mind fixed on Me; be mad-bhaktah, My devotee; be a madyaji,sacrificer to Me, be engaged in sacrifices to Me; namaskuru, bow down; mam, to Me. Offer ever your salutations to Me alone. Continuing thus in them, by surrendering all ends, means and needs to Vasudeva only, esyasi, you will come; mam, to Me; eva, alone. (This) satyam, truth: do I pratijane, promise; te, to you, i.e. in this matter I make this true promise. For, asi, you are; priyah, dear; me, to Me. The idea conveyed by the passage is: Having thus understood that the Lord is true in His pormise, and knowing for certain that liberation is the unfailing result of devotion to the Lord, one should have dedication to God as his only supreme goal. Having summed up surrender to God as the highest secret of steadiness in Karma-yoga, there-after, with the idea that complete realization, which is the fruit of adherence to Karma-yoga and which has been enjoined in all the Upanisads, has to be spoken about, the Lord says:

18.66 Sarva-dharman, all forms of rites and duties: Here the word dharma (righteousness) includes adharma (unrighteousness) as well; for, what is intended is total renunciation of all actions, as is enjoined in Vedic and Smrti texts like, 'One who has not desisted from bad actions' (Ka. 1.2.24), 'Give up religions and irreligion' (Mbh. Sa. 329.40), etc. Parityajya, abandoning all rites and duties; [Being a Ksatriya, Arjuna is not alified for steadfastness in Knowledge through monasticism in the primary sense. Still, the Gita being meant for mankind as a whole, monasticism is spoken of here by accepting Arjuna as a representative man.] saranam vraja, take refuge; mam ekam, in Me alone, the Self of all, the same in all, existing in all beings, the Lord, the Imperishable, free from being in the womb, birth, old age and death-by knowing that I am verily so. That is, know it for certain that there is nothing besides Me. By revealing My real nature, aham, I; moksayisyami, shall free; tva, you, who have this certitude of understanding; sarva-paphyah, from all sins, from all bondages in the form of righteousness and unrighteousness. It has also been stated, 'I, residing in their hearts, destroy the dark-ness born of ignorance with the luminous lamp of Knowledge' (10.11). Therefore, ma, do not; sucah, grieve, i.e. do not sorrow. In this scripture, the Gita, has knowledge been established as the supreme means to Liberation, or is it action, or both? Why does the doubt arise? (Because) the passages like, '৷৷.by realizing which one attains Immortality' (13.12), 'Then, having known Me in truth, he enters (into Me) immediately after that (Knowledge)' (55), etc. point to the attainment of Liberation through Knowledge alone. Texts like, 'Your right is for action alone' (2.47), '(you undertake) action itself (4.15), etc. show that actions have to be under-taken as a matter of compulsory duty. Since both Knowledge and action are thus enjoined as duties, therefore the doubt may arise that they, in combination as well, may become the cause of Liberation. Objection: What, again, would be the result of this iniry? Vedantin: Well, the resut will verily be this: The ascertainment of one of these as the cuase of the highest good. Hence this has to be investigated more extensively. Knowledge of the Self, however, is exclusively the cause of the highest good; for, through the removal of the idea of differences, it culminates in the result that is Liberation. The idea of distinction among action, agent and result is ever active with regard to the Self because of ignorance. This ignorance in the form, 'My work; I am the agent; I shall do this work for that resut', has been at work from time without beginning. The dispeller of this ignorance is this Knowledge regarding the Self-in the form, 'I am the absolute, non agent, free from action and result; there is none else other than myself because, when it (Knowledge) arises it despels the idea of differences which is the cause of engagement in action. The word 'however' above is used for ruling out the other two alternatives. This refutes the two other alternative views by showing that the highest good cannot be attained through mere actions, nor by a combination of Knowledge and action. Besides, since Liberation is not a product, therefore it is illogical that it should have action as its means. Indeed, an eternal entity cannot be produced by either action of Knowledge. Objection: In that case, ever exclusive Knowledge is purposeless. Vedantin: No, since Knowledge, being the destroyer of ignorance, culminates in Liberation which is directly experienced result. The fact that Knowledge, which removes the darkness of ignorance, culminates in Liberation as its result is directly perceived in the same way as is the result of the light of a lamp which removes ignorance the form of sanke etc. and darkness from objects such as rope etc. Indeed, the result of light amounts to the mere (awareness of the) rope, free from the wrong notions of snake etc. So is the case with Knowledge. As in the case of the acts like 'cutting down', 'producing fire by friction' etc., in which accessories such as the agent and others operate, and which have perceivable results, there is no possiblity of (the agent etc.) engaging in any other activity giving some other result apart from 'splitting into two', 'seeing (or lighting of) fire' etc, similarly, in the case of the agent and the other factors engaged in the 'act' of steadfastness in Knowledge which has a tangible result, there is no possibility of (their) engagement in any other action which has a result different from that in the form of the sole existence of the Self. Hence, steadfastness in Knowledge combined with action is not logical. Objection: May it not be argued that this is possible like the acts of eating and Agnihotra sacrifice etc.? [As such a common action as eating can go hand in hand with such Vedic rites as the Agnihotra-sacrifice, so, actions can be combined with Knowledge.] Vedantin: No, since it is unreasonable that, when Knowledge which resutls in Liberation is attained, there can remain a hankering for results of actions. Just as there is no desire for an action or its result [Action, i.e. digging etc.; result, i.e. bathing etc.] in connection with a well, pond, etc. when there is a flood all around, similarly when Knowledge which has Liberation for its result is attained there can be no possibility of hankering for any other result or any action which leads to it. Indeed, when somody is engaged in actions aimed at winning a kingdom, there can be no possibility of his engaging in any activity for securing a piece of land, or having a longing for it! Hence, action does not constitute the means to the highest good. Nor do Knowledge and action in combination. Further, Knowledge which has Liberation as its result can have no dependence on the assistance of action, because, being the remover of ignorance, it is opposed (to action). Verily, darkness cannot be the dispeller of darkness. Therefore Knowledge alone is the means to the highest good. Objection: Not so, because from non-performance of nityakarmas one incurs sin. Besides, freedom (of the Self) is eternal. As for the view that Liberation is attainable through Knowledge alone, it is wrong. For, if nityakarmas [As also the occasional duties (naimittika-karmas).] which are prescribed by the Vedas are not performed, then one will incur evil in the form of going to hell etc. Counter-objection: If this be so, then, since Liberation cannot come from action, will there not arise the contingency of there being no Liberation at all? Pseudo-Vedantin: Not so, for Liberation is eternal. as a result of performing nityakarmas there will not be incurring of evil, and as a result of not doing any prohibited action (nisiddha-karma) there will not be any possibility of birth in an undesirable body; from relinishing actions meant for desired results (kamya-karmas) there will be no possibility of being born in some desirable body. Since there is no cause to produce another body when the present body falls after the results of actions that produced this body get exhausted by experiencing them, and since one does not have attachment etc., therefore Liberation consists in the mere continuance of the Self in Its own natural state. Thus, Liberation is attained without effort. Objection: May it not be argued that, since in the case of actions done in many past lives-which are calculated to yield such results as attainment of heaven, hell, etc. but have not commenced bearing results-there is no possiblity of their being experienced, therefore they cannot be exhausted? Pseudo-Vedantin: No, since the suffering of pain from the effort involved in the nityakarmas can reasonably be (considered to be) the experiencing of their [i.e. of actions done in past lives, which have not commenced bearing their fruits.-Tr.] results. Or, since the nityakarmas, like expiations, may be considered as being meant for eliminating the sins incurred earlier, and since actions that have begun bearing their fruits get exhausted merely through their being experienced, therefore Liberation is attained without effort-provided no fresh actions are performed. Vedantin: No, since there is the Upanisadic text, 'Knowing Him alone, one goes beyond death; there is no other way to go by' (Sv. 3.8), which states that for Liberation there is no other path but enlightenment; also because there is the Upanisadic statement that Liberation for an unenlightened person is as impossible as the rolling up of the sky like leather (Sv. 6.20); and since it is mentioned in the Puranas and the Smrtis that Liberation follows only from Knowledge. (From your view) it also follows that there is no possibility of the exhaustion of the results of virtuous deeds which have not as yet begun yielding their fruits. And, as there is the possibility of the persistence of sins which were incurred in the past but have not yet commenced yielding results, similarly there can be the possibility of the persistence of virtues which have not yet begun bearing fruits. And so, if there be no scope of their being exhausted without creating another body, then there is no possibility of Liberation. And since attachment, hatred and delusion, which are the causes of virtue and vice, cannot be eradicated through any means other than Knowledge, therefore the eradication of virtue and vice becomes impossible. Besides, since the Sruti [See Ch. .2.23.1 and Br. 1.5.16-Tr.] mentions that nityakarmas have heaven as their result, and there is the Smrti text, 'Persons belonging to castes and stages of life, and engaged in their own duties' ['৷৷.attain to a high, immeasurable happiness.'-Tr.] (Ap. Dh. Su. 2.2.2.3), etc., therefore the exhaustion of (the fruits of) actions (through nityakarmas) is not possible. As for those who say, 'The nityakarmas, being painful in themselves, must surely be the result of evil deeds done in the past; but apart from being what they are, they have no other result because this is not mentioned in the Vedas and they are enjoined on the basis of the mere fact that one is alive'-(this is) not so, because actions which have not become operative cannot yield any result. Besides, there is no ground for experiencing a particular conseence in the form of pain [Pain involved in the performance of nityakarmas.] The statement, that the pain one suffers from the effort involved in performing the nityakarmas is the result of sinful acts done in past lives, is false. Indeed, it does not stand to reason that the result of any action which did not become operative at the time of death to yield its fruit is experienced in a life produced by some other actions. Otherwise, there will be no reason why the fruit of some action that is to lead to hell should not be experienced in a life that is produced by such actions as Agnihotra etc. and is meant for enjoying the result in the form of heaven! Besides, that (pain arising from the effort in performing nityakarmas) cannot be the same as the conseence in the form of the particular suffering arising from sin. Since there can be numerous kinds of sins with results productive of various kinds of sorrows, therefore, if it be imagined that their (sins') result will be merely in the form of pain arising from the effort in undertaking the nityakarmas, then it will certainly not be possible to suppose that they (the sins incurred in the past) are the causes of such obstacles as the pairs of opposites (heat and cold, etc.), disease etc., and that the result of sins incurred in the past will be only the pain arising from the exertion in performing nityakarmas, but not the sufferings like carrying stones on the head etc. Further, it is out of context to say this, that the pain resulting from the effort in performing nityakarmas is the result of sinful acts done in the past. Objection: How? Vedantin: What is under discussion is that the sin committed in the past, which has not begun to bear fruit, cannot be dissipated. In that context you say that pain resulting from the effort in undertaking nityakarmas is the result of action which has begun bearing fruit, not of that which has not yet commenced yielding fruit! On the other hand, if you think that all sins committed in the past have begun yielding their results, then it is unreasonable to specify that the pain resulting from the exertion in performing the nitya-karmas is their only result. And there arises the contingency of the injunction to perform nityakarmas becoming void, because the sinful deed which has begun bearing fruit can ligically be dissipated only be experiencing its result. Further, if pain be the result of nityakarmas enjoined by the Vedas, then it is seen to arise from the very effort in undertaking nityakarmas-as in the case of excercise etc. To imagine that it is the result of something else is illogical. [The pain arising from bodily excercise is the result of the excercise itself, and not the result of any past sin! Similarly, the pain resulting from undertaking nityakarmas is the conseence of that performance itself, and need not be imagined to be the result of any past sin.] And if the nityakarmas have been enjoined simply on the basis of a person's being alive, it is unreasonable that it should be the result of sins committed in the past, any more than expiation is. An expiation that has been enjoined following a particular sinful act is not the result of that sin! On the other hand, if the suffering arising from expiation be the reslut of that very sin which is its cause, then the pain from the effort in performing nityakarmas, though prescribed merely on the fact of one's being alive, may become the fruit of that very fact of one's being alive-which was itself the occasion (for enjoining the nityakarmas)-, because both the nityakarmas and expiatory duties are indistinguishable so far as their being occasioned by something is concerned. Moreover, there is the other fact: There can be no such distinction that only the pain resulting from the performance of nityakarmas is the result of past sinful deeds, but not so the pain from performing kamya-karmas (rites and duties undertaken for desired results), because the pain in performing Agnihotra-sacrifice etc. is the same when it is performed as a nityakarma or as a kamya-karma. Thus the latter also may be the result of past sinful acts. This being the case, it is untenable to assume on the ground of circumstantial inference that, since no result is enjoined in the Vedas for nityakarmas and since its prescription cannot be justified on any other ground, therefore pain from the effort in performing nityakarmas is the result of sinful past deeds. Thus, the (Vedic) injunction being unjustifiable otherwise, it can be inferred that nityakarmas have got some result other than the pain arising from the effort in undertaking them. It also involves this contradiction: It is contradictory to say that through the performance of nityakarma a result of some other action is experienced. And when this is admitted, it is again a contradiction to say that that very experience is the result of the nityakarma, and yet that niyakarma has no result! Moreover, when Agnihotra and other sacrifices are performed for desirable results (Kamya-Agnihotra), then the Agnihotra etc. which are performed as nityakarma (Nitya-Agnihotra) become accomplished simultaneously (on a account of its being a part ofthe former). Hence, since the Kamya-Agnihotra (as an act) is dependent on and not different from the Nitya-Agnihotra, therefore the result of the Agnihotra and other sacrifices performed with a desire for results will get exhausted through the suffering involved in the exertion in undertaking it (the Nitya-Agnihotra). On the other hand, if the result of Kamya-Agnihotra etc. be different, viz heaven etc., then even the suffering arising from the exertion in performing them ought to be necessarily different (from the suffering involved in the Nitya-Agnihotra). And that is not the fact, because it contradicts what is directly perceived; for the pain resulting from the effort in performing only the Nitya-(-Agnihotra) does not differ from the pain resulting from the exertion in undertaking the Kamya (-Agnihotra). Besides, there is this other consideration: Actions which have not been enjoined or prohibited (by the scriptures) produce immediate results. But those enjoined or prohibited by the scriptures do not produce immediate results; were they to do so, then there would be no effort even with regard to heaven etc. and injunctions concerning unseen results. And it cannot be imagined that only the fruit of (Nitya-) Agnihotra etc. gets exhausted through the suffering arising from the effort in performing them, but the Kamya (-Agnihotra) has exalted results like heaven etc. merely as a conseence of the fact of desire for results, though as acts there is no essential difference between them (the Nitya and the Kamya) and there is no additional subsidiary part, processes of performance, etc. (in the kamya-Agnihotra). Therefore, it can never be established that nitya-karmas have no unseen results. And hence, enlightenment alone, not the performance of nityakarmas, is the cuase of the total dissipation of actions done through ignorance, be they good or bad. For, all actions have for their origin ignorance and desire. Thus has it been established (in the following passages) that action (rites and duties) is meant for the ignorant, and steadfastness in Knowledge-after renunciation of all actions-is meant for the enlightened: 'both of them do not know' (2.19); 'he who knows this One as indestructible, eternal' (2.21); 'through the Yoga of Knowledge for the men of realization; through the Yoga of Action for the yogis' (3.3); 'the ignorant, who are attached to work' (3.26); 'But৷৷.the one who is a knower৷৷.does not become attached, thinking thus: "The organs rest on the objects of the organs"' (3.28); 'The embodied man৷৷.having given up all actions mentally, continues' (5.13); 'Remaining absorbed in the Self, the knower of Reality should think, "I certainly do not do anything"' (5.8); i.e; the unenlightened person thinks, 'I do'; 'For (the sage) who wishes to ascend (to Dhyana-yoga), action is said to be the means৷৷.when he has ascended (when he is established in the Yoga of Meditation), inaction alone is said to be the means' (6.3); 'noble indeed' are all the three (classes of) unenlightened persons, 'but the man of Knowledge is the very Self. (This is) My opinion' (7.18); the unenlightened who perform their rites and duties, 'who are desirous of pleasures, attain the state of going and returning' (9.21); 'becoming non-different from Me and meditative' (9.22) and endowed with steadfast devotion, they worship (Me) the Self which has been described as comparable to space and taintless; and 'I grant that possession of wisdom by which they reach Me' (10.10); i.e., the unenlightened persons who perform rites and duties 'do not reach Me.' Those who perform works for the Lord and who, though they be the most devout, are ignorant persons performing rites and duties,-they remain involved in practices which, in a descending order, culminate in giving up the fruit of actions (cf. 12.6-11). But those who meditate on the indefinable Immutable take recourse to the disciplines stated in the passages beginning with 'He who is not hateful towards any creature' (12.13) and ending with that Chapter, and also resort to the path of Knowledge presented in the three chapters beginning with the Chapter on the 'field'. The three results of actions, viz the undesirable etc. (cf. 12), do not accrue only to the mendicants belonging to the Order of Paramahamsas (the highest Order of monks)-who have renounced all actions that originate from the five causes beginning with the locus (cf. 14), who possess the knowledge of the oneness and non-agentship of the Self (17,20), who continue in the supreme steadfastness in Knowledge, who know the real nature of the Lord, and who have taken refuge in the unity of the real nature of the Lord with the Self. It does accrue to the others who are not monks, the ignorant persons who perform rites and duties. Such is this distinction made in the scripture Gita with regard to what is duty and what is not. Objection: May it not be argued that it cannot be proved that all actions are due to ignorance? Reply: No, (it can be proved,) as in the case of slaying a Brahmin. Although the nityakarmas are known from the scriptures, still they are meant only for the ignorant. As such an action as killing a Brahmin, even though known to be a source of evil from the scripture prohibiting it, is still perpetrated by one who has defects such as ignorance, passion, etc.-because impulsion to any action is otherwise not possible-, so also is it with regard to the nitya, naimittika and kamya actions. Objection: May it not be held that impulsion to nityakarma etc. is not possible if the Self be not known as a distinct entity? [Unless one knows the Self to be distinct from the body etc. he will not perform the nityakarmas etc. meant for results in the other worlds, viz heaven etc. (Tr.:) In place of vyatiriktatmani, Ast. reads 'deha-vyatiriktatmani, the Self which is distinct from the body'.] Reply: No, since it is seen that with regard to actions which are of the nature of motion and are accomplished by the not-Self, one engages in them with the idea, 'I do.' [The actionless Self is not the agent of the movements of the body etc. Still agentship is superimposed on It through ignorance.] Objection: Can it not be said that the notion of egoism with regard to the aggregate of body etc. occurs in a figurative sense; it is not false? Reply: No, since its effects [i.e. the effects of the notion of egoism.] also will become figurative. Objection: The notion of 'I' with regard to the aggregate of one's own body etc. occurs in a figurative sense. As with regard to one's own son it is said (in the Veda), 'It is you yourself who is called the son' (Sa. Br. 14.9.4.26), and in common parlance also it is said, 'This cow is my very life', so is the case here. [As the use of the word 'I' with regard to a son is figurative, so also with regard to the body.] This is certainly not a false notion. However, a false notion (of identity) occurs in the case of a stump and a man, when the distinction between them is not evident (due to darkness). Reply: A figuratively expressed notion cannot lead to an effect in the real sense, because that (notion) is used for the eulogy of its basis with the help of a word of comparison which remains understood. As for instance, such sentences as, 'Devadatta is a lion', 'The boy is a fire'-implying 'like a lion', 'like a fire', on the basis of the similarity of cruelty, the tawny colour, etc.-are meant only for eulogizing Devadatta and the boy who are the basis (i.e. the subjects of the two sentences). But no action of a lion or a fire is accomplished because of the use of the figurative words or ideas. On the contrary, one experiences the evil effects of false notions. [Therefore the idea of 'I' with regard to one's body etc. does not occur in a secondary sense, but it does so falsely.] And with regard to the subjects of the figurative notions, one understands, 'This Devadatta cannot be a lion; this boy cannot be a fire.' Similarly, actions done by the aggregate of body etc., which is the 'Self' in a figurative sense, cannot be held to have been done by the Self which is the real subject of the notion of 'I'. For, actions done by the figurative lion or fire cannot be considered to have been accomplished by the real lion or fire. Nor is any action of the real lion and fire accomplished through the (figurative) cruelty or tawnyaness; for, their purpose is fully served by being used for eulogy. And those who are praised know, 'I am not a lion; I am not fire; and neither is the work of a lion or fire mine.' So the more ligical notion is, 'The action of the aggregate (of body etc.) do not belong to me who am the real Self', and not, 'I am the agent; it is my work.' As for the assertion made by some that the Self acts through Its own memory, deisre and effort, which are the causes of activity-that is not so, for they are based on false knowledge. Memory, desire, effort, etc. indeed follow from the tendencies born from the experience of the desirable and the undesirable results of actions (-which actions themselves arise from the notions of the 'desirable' and the 'undesirable') caused by false knowledge. [False knowledge gives rise to the ideas of the desirable and the undesirable. From these arise desire and repulsion. Actions which follow give rise to the experience of their desirable and undesirable results. Such experiences create impressions in the mind, from which are born memory etc.] Just as in this life virtue, vice and the experience of their results are cuased by the identification (of the Self) with the aggregate of body etc. and attraction, repulsion, etc., so also was it in the previous birth, and even in the life preceding that. Thus it can be inferred that past and future mundane existence is without beginning and is a product of ignorance. And from this it becomes proved that the absolute cessation of mundane existence is caused by steadfastness in Knowledge, accompanied by renunciation of all rites and duties. Besides, since self-identification with the body is nothing but ignorance, therefore, when the (ignorance) ceases, there remains so possibility of re-birth, and so, mundane existence becomes impossible. The identification of the Self with the aggregate of body etc. is nothing but ignorance, because in common life it is not seen that anybody who knows, 'I am different from cattle etc., and the cattle etc. are different from me', entertains the notion of 'I' with regard to them. However, mistaken perceiving a stump to be a man, one may out of indiscrimination entertain the idea of 'I' with regard to the aggregate of body etc.; not so when perceiving them as distinct. As for that notion of considering the son to be oneself-as mentioned in, 'It is you yourself who is called the son' (Sa. Br. 14.9.4.26)-, that is a metaphor based on the relationship between the begotten and the begetter. And no real action like eating etc.can be accomplished through something considered metaphorically as the Self, just as actions of the real lion or fire (cannot be accomplished) by someone metaphorically thought of to be a lion or fire. Objection: Since an injunction relating to an unseen result is valid, therefore, may it not be said that the purposes of the Self are accomplished by the body and organs which are figuratively considered to be the Self? Reply: No, since the thinking of them as the Self is the result of ignorance. The body, organs, etc. are not the Self in a figurative sense. Objection: How then? Reply: Although the Self is devoid of relationship, still, by an ascription of relationship (to the Self), they (body etc.) come to be regarded as the Self, verily through a false notion. For, this identification (of body etc.) with the Self exists so long as the false notion is there, and ceases to exist when it is not there. So long as ignorance lasts, identification of the Self with the aggregate of body and organs is seen only in the case of non-discriminating, immature, ignorant poeple who say, 'I am tall', 'I am fair'. But in the case of discriminating persons who possess the knowledge, 'I am different from the aggregate of body etc.', there does not arise the idea of egoism with regard to the body etc. at that time (i.e. simultaneously with that knowledge). Hence, since it (i.e. identification of the Self with the body etc.) ceases in the absence of the false notion, therefore it is a creation of that (false notion), and not a figurative notion. It is only when the common and the uncommon features of the lion and Devadatta, or of fire and the boy, are known distinctly, that a figurative notion or verbal expression can occur; not when the common and the uncommon features are unknown. As for the argument that (the figurative notion should be accepted) on the authority of the Vedas, we say, 'No', because their validity concerns unseen results. The validity of the Vedas holds good only with regard to matters concerning the relation between ends and means of Agnihotra etc., which are not known through such valid means of knowledge as direct perception; but not with regard to objects of direct perception etc., because the validity of the Vedas lies in revealing what is beyond direct perception. Therefore it is not possible to imagine that the idea of egism with regard to the aggregate of body etc., arising from an obviously of false knowledge, is a figurative notion. Surely, even a hundred Vedic texts cannot become valid if they assert that fire is cold or non-luminous! Should a Vedic text say that fire is cold or non-luminous, even then one has to assume that the intended meaning of the text is different, for otherwise (its) validity cannot be maintained; but one should not assume its meaning in a way that might contradict some other valid means of knowledge or contradict its own statement. Objection: May it not be said that since actions are undertaken by one possessed of a false idea of agentship, therefore, when the agent ceases to be so ['According to you (the Vedantin), an ignorant man alone can be an agent. Therefore, when he becomes illumined, he will cease to be ignorant and conseently the Vedas will cease to be valid for him.'] the Vedas will become invalid? Reply: No, since the Vedas become logically meaningful in respect of knowledge of Brahman. [Though the Vedic injunctions about rituals etc. be inapplicable in the case of an enlightened person, still they have empirical validity before enlightenment. Besides, the Vedas have real validity with regard to the knowledge of Brahman.] Objection: May it not be said that there arises the contingency of the Vedic texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman becoming as invalid as those texts enjoining rites and duties? Reply: No, since there cannot possibly be any notion which can remove (the knowledge of Brahman). Unlike the manner in which the idea of egoism with regard to the aggregate of body etc. is removed after the realization of the Self from hearing the Vedic injunctions regarding the knowledge of Brahman, the realization of the Self in the Self can never be removed in any way in that manner by anything whatsoever-just as the knowledge that fire is hot and luminous is irremovable-, since (Self-) realization is inseparable from its result (i.e. cessation of ignorance). Besides, the Vedic texts enjoining rites (and duties) etc. are not invalid, because they, through the generation of successively newer tendencies by eliminating the successively preceding tendencies, are meant for creating the tendency to turn towards the indwelling Self. [The Vedic injunctions make people up rituals etc. by giving up their earlier worldly tendencies. Thery their minds become purified. The purified mind then aspires to know the indwelling Self. Thus, since the ritualistic injunctions are meant for making a person turn towards the knowledge ofthe indwelling Self, they are not invalid.] Although the means be unreal (in itself), still it may be meaningful in relation to the truth of the purpose it serves, as are the eulogistic sentences (arthavada) [See note on p. 40.-Tr.] occuring along with injunctions. Even in the world, when it becomes necessary to make to child or a lunatic drink milk etc. it is said that it will help growth of hair [Cuda, lit. hair on the top of the head; or single lock of hair left on the crown of the head after tonsure. See V.S.A.] etc.! Before the dawn of Knowledge, the (ritualistic) Vedic texts concerned with a different situation [The situation obtaining before the dawn of Self-knowledge.] are also as valid in themselves as are direct perception etc. occuring due to Self-identification with the body etc. On the other hand, as for your view 'The Self, though inactive by Itself, acts through Its mere proximity; and that itself constitutes agentship of the Self in the primary sense. Just as it is well known that a king, though not himself engaged in a battle, is, merely by virtue of his being in charge, said to be fighting when his soldiers are fighting, and that he is victorious or defeated; similarly, as the ?nder of an army acts through his mere orders, and it is seen that the results of the actions accrue to the king or to the ?nder; or, just as the actions of the priests are ascribed to the sacrificer,-in that very manner are the actions done by the body etc. ought to be of the Self because the result of those actions accrues to the Self. And, as the agentship of a magnet which, in fact, is not active, is attributed to it in the primary sense because it causes a piece of iron to move, similar is the agentship of the Self'-that is wrong, since it will amunt to an inactive entity becoming an agent. Objection: May not agentship be of various kinds? Reply: No, for in the case of the 'king' and others it is seen that they have agentship even in the primary sense. As for the king, he fights even through his personal engagement. And he has agentship in the primary sense by virtue of making (his) warriors fight, distributing wealth, and also reaping the fruits of victory or defeat. Similarly, the agentship of a sacrificer is primary by virtue of his offering the main oblation and giving gifts due to the priests. Therefore it is understood that the agentship which is attributed to an inactive entity is figurative. If primary agentship consisting in their personal engagement is not perceived in the case of the king, a sacrificer and others, then it could be assumed that they have primary agentship owing to the mere fact of their presence, just as a magnet has by virtue of making the iron move. But in the case of the king and others it is not perceived that they have no personal engagement in that way. Therefore, even the agentship owing to mere presence is a figurative one. And if that be so, the connection with the result of such agentship will also be figurative. No action in the primary sense is performed by an agent figuratively thought to be so. Hence the assertion is certainly wrong that owing to the activities of the body etc. the actionless Self becomes an agent and experiencer. But everything becomes possible due to error. This is just as it happens in dream or in jugglery! Besides, in deep sleep, absorption in Brahman, etc. where the current of the mistaken idea of Self-identity with the body etc. ceases, evils like agentship, enjoyership, etc. are not perceived. Therefore this delusion of mundane existence is surely due to false knowledge; but it is not reality. Conseently, it is established that it ceases absolutely as a result of full enlightenment. Having summed up in this chapter the import of the whole of the scripture Gita, and having again summarized it specially here at the end (in verse 66) for the sake of emphasizing the purport of the Scripture, now after that, the Lord states the rules for handing down the Scripture:

18.67 Idam, this Scripture; which has been taught by Me te, to you, for your good, for terminating mundane existence; an vacyam, should not be taught (-na is connected with the remote word vacyam-); atapaskaya, to one who is devoid of austerities. It should kadacana, never, under any condition whatsoever; be taught abhaktaya, to one who is not a devotee, who is devoid of devotion to his teacher and God, even if he be a man of austerity. Neither should it be taught even asurusave, to one who does not redner service-even though he may be a devotee and a man of austerity. Na ca, nor as well; to him yah, who; abhyasuyati, cavils; mam, at Me, at Vasudeva-thinking that I am an ordinary person; to him who, not knowing My Godhood, imputes self-adulation etc. to Me and cannot tolerate Me. He too is unfit; to him also it should not be imparted. From the force of the context it is understood that the Scripture should be taught to one who has devotion to the Lord, is austere, renders service, and does not cavil. As to that, since it is seen (in a Smrti)-'to one who is intelligent or to one who is austere'-that there is an option between the two, it follows that this should be imparted either to an austere person given to service and devotion, or to an intelligent person endowed with them. It should not be imparted to an austere or even an intelligent person if he lacks service and devotion. It should not be taught to one who cavils at the Lord, even though he be possessed of all the good alities. And it should be taught to one whoserves his teacher and is devout. This is the rule for transmitting the Scripture. Now the Lord states the fruit derived by one who transmits the Scripture:

18.68 Yah, he who; abhi-dhasyati, will speak of, i.e., will present with the help of the text and its meaning, as I have done to you; imam, this; paramam, highest-that which has Liberation as its purpose; guhyam, secret, as spoken of above-(i.e.) the text in the form of a conversation between Kesava and Arjuna; madbhaktesu, to My devotees-. How will present? This is being stated: Krtva, entertaining; param, supreme; bhaktim, devotion; mayi, to Me, i.e., entertainting an idea thus-'A service is being rendered by me to the Lord who is the supreme Teacher'-. Tho him comes this result: esyati, he will reach; mam, Me; eva, alone. He is certainly freed. No doubt should be entertained in this regard. By the repetition of (the word) bhakti (devotion) [In the word madbhaktesu.], it is understood that one becomes fit for being taught (this) Scripture by virtue of devotion alone to Him. Besides,

18.69 Ca, and; tasmat, as compared with him, with the one who hands down the Scripture; na kascit, none else; manusyesu, among human beings; is priya-krt-tamah, the best accomplisher of what is dear; me, to Me, i.e., among the present human beings, surely none else other than him exists who is a better accomplisher of what I cherish. Moreover, na bhavita, nor will there be in future; anyah, anyone else, a second person; bhuvi, in he world, here; priyatarah, dearer; tasmat, than him. [It may be argued that, since for a seeker of Liberation meditation is the best means for It, therefore he will have no inclination to transmit scriptural teachings. To this the Lord's answer is: One longing for Liberation has a duty to impart this scriptural teaching to one possessing the aforesaid alities.]

18.70 Ca, and; even he yah, who; adhyesyate, will study; imam, this; samvadam, conversation, the text in the form of a dialogue; between avayoh, us two; which is dharmyam, conducive to virtue, not divorced from virtue; tena, by him; this will be accomplished through that study; aham, I; syam, shall be; istah, adored; jnana-yajnena, through the Sacrifice in the form of Knowledge. Iti, this is me, My; matih, judgement. As compared with the various sacrifices, viz rituals, loud prayer, prayer uttered in a low voice and mental prayer, the Sacrifice in the from of Knowledge is the best [See 4.33.] because it is mental. Hence, the study of the scripture Gita is praised as that Sacrifice in the form of Knowledge. Or, this (verse) may merely be a judgement about the result. The idea is that the result of the study is comparable to the result of the Sacrifice in the form of the knowledge of gods and others. Now, this is the reward for the hearer:

18.71 Yah narah, any man who; being sraddhavan, reverential; and anasuyah, free from cavilling; srnuyat api, might even hear this text-the word even suggests that one who knows the meaning (of the Scripture) hardly needs to be mentioned-; sah api, he too; becoming muktah, free from sin; prapnuyat, shall attain; subhan, the blessed, auspicious; lokan, worlds; punya-karmanam, of those who perform virtuous deeds, of those who perform rites like Agnihotra etc. In order to ascertaini whether or not the disciple has comprehended the meaning of the Scripture, the Lord asks (the following estion), the intention of the estioner beings, 'If it is known that it has not been comprehended, I shall again make him grasp it through other means.' Hery is shown the duty of the teacher that a student should be made to achieve his goal by taking the help of a different method.

18.72 O Partha, kaccit etat, has this that has been said by Me; been srutam, listened to, grasped through hearing; ekagrena, with a none-pointed; cetasa, mind? Or have you been inattentive? O Dhananjaya, kaccit, has; te, your; ajnana-sammohah, delusion caused by ignorance, bewilderment, natural indiscrimination; been pranastah, destroyed, for which purpose has there been this effort on your part for hearing the Scripture, and on My part, the effort of being a teacher?

18.73 O Acyuta, (my) mohah, born of ignorance and the cause of all evil in the form of mundane existence, and difficult to cross like an ocean;l nastah has been destroyed. And smrtih, memory, regarding the reality of the Self-on the acisition of which follows the loosening of all the bonds; labdha, has been regained, tvat-prasadat, through Your grace maya, by me, who am dependent on Your grace. By this estion about the destruction of delusion and the answer to it, it becomes conclusively revealed that the fruit derived from understanding the import of the entire Scripture is this much alone-which is the destruction of delusion arising from ignorance and the regaining of the memory about the Self. And similarly, in the Upanisadic text beginning with 'I grieve because I am not a knower of the Self' (Ch. 7.1.3), it is shown that all bonds become destroyed when the Self is realized. There are also the words of the Upanisadic verses, 'The knot of the heart gets untied' (Mu. 2.2.8); 'at that time (or to that Self) what delusion and what sorrow can there be for that seer of oneness?' (Is.7). Now then, sthitah, asmi, I stand under Your ?nd; gata-sandehah, with (my) doubts removed. Karisye, I shall follow; tava, Your; vacanam, instruction. By Your grace I have achieved the goal of life. The idea is, there is no duty, as such, for me. The teaching of the Scripture is concluded. There-after, now in order to show the connection (of this) with the (main) narrative-.

18.74 Aham, I; iti, thus; asrausam, heard; imam, this; samvadam, conversation, as has been narrated; vasudevasya, of Vasudeva; and mahatmanah, parthasya, of the great-soulded Partha; which is adbhutam, unie, extremely wonderful; and roma-harsanam, makes one's hair stand on end.

18.75 And vyasa-prasadat, through the favour of Vyasa, by having received divine vision from him; aham, I; srutvan, heard; etat [The Commentator uses etam in the masculine gender, in place of etat in the text, because it refers to the masculine word samvada.] (should rather be etam), this; guhyam, secret dialogue, such as it is; concerning the param, supreme; Yogam, Yoga-or, this dialogue itself is the Yoga because it is meant for it-; krsnat, from Krsna; yogeswarat, from the Lord of yogas; kathayatah, while He was speaking; svayam, Himself; saksat, actually; not indirectly through others.

18.76 And, rajan, O king, Dhrtarastra; after having heard, samsmrtya samsmrtya, while repeatedly remembering; imam, this; adbhuttam, unie; samvadam, dialogue; kesava-arjunayoh, between Kesava and Arjuna; which is punyam, sacred, removes sin even when heard; hrsyami, I rejoice; muhuh, muhuh, every moment.

18.77 And, rajan, O King; samsmrtya samsmrtya, repeatedly recollecting; tat, that; ati-adbhutam, greatly extraordinary; rupam, form, the Cosmic form; hareh, of Hari; mahan vismayah me, I am struck with great wonder. And hrsyami, I rejoice; punah punah, again and again.

18.78 To be brief, yatra, where, the side on which; there is Krsna, yogeswarah, the Lord of yogas-who is the Lord of all the yogas and the source of all the yogas, since they originate from Him; and yatra, where, the side on which; there is Partha, dhanurdharah, the wielder of the bow, of the bow called Gandiva; tatra, there, on that side of the Pandavas; are srih, fortune; vijayah, victory; and there itself is bhutih, prosperity, great abundance of fortune; and dhruva, unfailing; nitih, prudence. Such is me, my ; matih, conviction.